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INTRODUCTION
Addressing a question that has long been a subject of debate
among legal commentators,' the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits recently
held that "knowing possession" is not sufficient to impose insider trad-
ing liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.2 At issue in this debate
is whether section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require a causal connection
between the material, nonpublic information and the insider's trad-
ing-that is, a showing that the insider actually used the information-
or whether knowing possession of such information at the time of the
trade is sufficient for liability to attach.
Few courts have addressed this issue directly.3 Indeed, in many
cases it has not been necessary for the courts to address the issue: of-
ten it is clear that the insider used the information.4 As Allan Horwich
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' See Allan Horwich, "Use Test" in Insider Trading Cases Update, CORP. LEGAL 'TMES,
Nov. 1998, at 61 ("In the past year two Courts of Appeal have resolved a question
which had long been the subject of debate among commentators .. ").
2 SeeUnited States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 804 (1999) ("[Wle reject the government's proffered 'knowing possession' stan-
dard for insider trading violations .. .. "); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir.
1998) ("[M]ere knowing possession ... is not a per se violation.").
3 See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1334 ("Surprisingly, few courts have directly addressed
whether § 10(b) [and] Rule 10b-5... require a causal connection between the mate-
rial nonpublic information and the insider's trading or whether knowing possession of
material nonpublic information while trading is sufficient for liability."). A few courts
have addressed the issue indirectly or in dicta. See, e.g., United States v. Teicher, 987
F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1993) (advocating a knowing possession standard but assert-
ing that it was unnecessary to rule on the issue); Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C.
633, 644 (1971) (appearing to advocate a "use" standard).
' See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INsIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT,
AND PREVENTION § 3.04, at 3-22 (1999) ("In the typical case, there is no question that
the insider traded in order to take advantage of material nondisclosed information.");
see also Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Actual Use of Inside Information at Issue
(239)
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has noted, however, "[t]he scarcity of pertinent cases does
not... mean that the question is merely of abstract interest.... [T]he
issue frequently arises in counseling [corporate executives] who may
obtain inside information pending completion of a transaction or in
the midst of a pre-established trading program." '
This Comment will examine the "possession versus use" debate,
assessing the arguments that have been made in support of the two
sides and concluding that "knowing possession" is the more appropri-
ate standard. Because one cannot develop a sensible rule without first
understanding the rule's purpose, Part I will begin with an overview of
insider trading, including the rationale underlying its prohibition.
Part II will then present the "possession versus use" debate, exploring
the origins of the debate, as well as the recent cases addressing the is-
sue. Next, Part III will examine more closely the arguments advanced
in support of the "use" standard. Advocates of the "use" standard have
based their arguments largely on Supreme Court precedent. As dis-
cussed in Part III, however, this reliance on prior case law is misplaced
because the question of "possession versus use" was not at issue in the
cases relied upon. Rather than relying on prior case law, this Com-
ment suggests that one should instead consider the reasons underly-
ing the insider trading prohibition, as well as the difficulty of proof
associated with prosecution, to determine the appropriate standard.
These considerations form the basis for the arguments in support of
the "knowing possession" standard. Part IV will discuss these argu-
ments, concluding that "possession" is the more appropriate test for
insider trading liability.
I. OVERVIEW OF INSIDER TRADING
"'Insider trading' is a term of art that refers to unlawful trading in
securities by persons who possess material nonpublic information
about the company whose shares are traded or the market for its
NAT'L L.J., June 21, 1993, at 20 ("In most insider-trading cases .... the distinction be-
tween 'use' and 'possession' is of limited significance.").
5 Allan Horwich, Possession Versus Use: Is There a Causation Element in the Prohibition
on Insider Trading?, 52 Bus. LAiW. 1235, 1236 (1997). Horwich presents several interest-
ing hypothetical situations in which the issue might arise. Consider, for example, an
executive of a public company who, "nearing retirement, begins a regular program to
liquidate her large holding of company stock in order to diversify her portfolio, in-
structing her broker to sell 1000 shares on the first of each month. During the pro-
gram, the executive learns nonpublic negative material information about the com-
pany." Id. at 1235.
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shares."6 Although the federal securities laws do not expressly pro-
scribe insider trading, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934' and Rule 10b-58 promulgated thereunder by the Securities and
6 LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 1.01, at 1-6. This definition of insider trading, of
course, presupposes the answer to the "possession versus use" debate. Compare RALPH
C. FERRARAETAL., FERRARA ONINSIDERTRADING AND THE WALL § 2.01 [1], at 2-2 to 2-3
(1998) (explaining that insider trading occurs "when a corporate 'insider'... trades
the securities of the corporation while in possession ofmaterial, nonpublic information"
(emphasis added)), with 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS ON SECURrIMS FRAUD & COMMODMTES FRAUD § 7.4(100), at 7:101 (2d ed.
1998) ("[I]nsider trading is the use of... material nonpublic information ... to buy
securities (if the information is favorable) or sell them (if the information is unfavor-
able)." (emphasis added)). Unless quoting or describing the views of others, this
Comment will employ "possession" language when discussing the nature of insider
trading violations.
As many commentators have noted, the term "insider trading" is a misnomer. For
example, liability for insider trading has not been limited to the class of persons tradi-
tionally considered "insiders." See LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 1.01, at 1-6 ("The pro-
hibition against insider trading applies to a larger class of persons than those tradi-
tionally considered corporate insiders."); Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading 41 BUS. LAW. 223, 224
(1985) [hereinafter Task Force Report] ("The cases in which the Commission and pri-
vate litigants have sought to impose liability under existing law have not been limited
to insiders, at least as that term is commonly understood... ."); see also infra note 12
and accompanying text (explaining that the term "insider" refers to a broader class of
persons than those traditionally considered corporate insiders). Furthermore, a per-
son may be liable for insider trading even if he did not actually trade. See Task Force
Report, supra, at 224 (explaining that "not all defendants have been traders-those who
'tip' others who then trade" have also been found guilty of insider trading); see also in-
fra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing tipper liability).
Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange-...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997).
a Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
1999]
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Exchange Commission ("SEC") have been interpreted as prohibiting
insider trading.9 In interpreting these provisions, the SEC and the
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.101>5 (1999).
9 The original purpose of section 10(b) was not necessarily to prohibit insider trad-
ing. See ELiZABETH SZOCIyJ, THE LAW AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH OF A LEvEL
PLAYING FIELD 5 (1993) ("Contrary to popular belief, Section 10(b) ... which today is
the most commonly used section to prosecute insider trading, was not originally de-
signed to serve this purpose."); id. at 6 ("Nowhere in the legislation or in related dis-
cussions at the time is there an implication that Section 10(b) should be interpreted to
include or could be applied against insider trading."). For a comprehensive discussion
of the original purpose of section 10(b), see Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990). Nor was the central
purpose of Rule 10b-5 to prohibit insider trading; indeed, the rule was initially drafted
to prevent insiders from making fraudulent statements to shareholders about the cor-
poration so that they could buy shares more cheaply. See Milton Freeman, Discussion
at the Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws (Nov. 18-19, 1966), in
22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922-23 (1967) (discussing the adoption of Rule 10b-5). In 1943,
Milton Freeman, an SEC attorney, received news about a company president who was
buying up shares of stock of his own company, simultaneously telling shareholders that
the company was faltering, though in fact the prospects of the company were ex-
tremely favorable. See id. at 922 (describing a phone call in which Freeman learned
that "'the president of some company... is... buying up the stock of his com-
pany... and... telling [shareholders] that the company is doing very badly, whereas,
in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled'"). Attempting to address this prob-
lem, Freeman drafted Rule 10b-5. See id. (explaining that Rule 10b-5 "was intended to
give the Commission power to deal with this problem").
Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994), is the only provision that expressly pro-
scribes trading by insiders. See, e.g., FERRARA ET AL, supra note 6, § 1.02(11] [a], at 1-3
("The only provision of the securities statutes that expressly regulates insider trading is
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, which prohibits 'short swing' profits by officers,
directors, and the direct or indirect beneficial owners of more than 10% of any class of
equity securities." (footnote omitted)). "Short-swing" trading refers to "any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase" within a period of less than six months. 15 U.S.C. §
78p(b). Many have asserted that section 16 was designed to prevent insider trading.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (explaining that the purpose of the provision is to "prevent[ ]
the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer"). But section 16 imposes
liability on insiders who engage in short-swing trading, regardless of whether they were
in possession of material, nonpublic information at the time of the trades. And insid-
ers can avoid liability under section 16(b)-even if they are trading while in possession
of material, nonpublic information-as long as they do not enter into offsetting trans-
actions within a period of less than six months (i.e., a sale following a purchase or a
purchase following a sale). Some commentators have thus proposed alternative ex-
planations of the purpose of section 16(b). SeeKarl Shumpei Okamoto, Rereading Sec-
lion 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 27 GA. L. REv. 183, 185 (1992) ("The purpose of
Section 16(b) is not the deterrence of trading on non-public information.... Its pur-
pose is to deter insiders from trading to artificially affect market prices-to deter insid-
ers from sending false signals when in fact there is no inside information at all."); Steve
Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42
HASTINGS LJ. 393, 453 (1991) (asserting that the purpose of section 16 was to prevent
the manipulation of corporate opportunities).
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federal courts have developed two distinct theories of liability: the
"traditional" or "classical" theory, and the "misappropriation" theory
of insider trading.
A. Theories of Liability: The Classical Theory
and the Misapprnpriation Theory
Under the classical theory of insider trading, a corporate insider
may not trade in the securities of his corporation while in possession
of material, nonpublic information."0 Such trading violates section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 because of the relationship of trust and confi-
dence that exists between the shareholders of a corporation and cor-
porate insiders; because of this relationship, "insiders who have ob-
tained confidential information by reason of their position with that
corporation" may not take "unfair advantage of... uninformed...
stockholders."" The term "insider" refers to a broader class of per-
sons than those traditionally considered corporate insiders and in-
cludes "temporary insiders" such as attorneys, investment bankers,
consultants, and accountants.
2
Liability, however, is not limited to those who actually trade; nor is
it limited to insiders. An insider who "tips" material, nonpublic in-
formation violates section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 if the tip breaches a
fiduciary duty and the tippee (the recipient of such a tip) trades, even
if the insider does not trade.'3 The tippee may also be liable for trad-
Section 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994), and section 21A, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1994),
also address insider trading, although neither defines insider trading or makes it ille-
gal. Section 20A provides a private cause of action for those who trade contempora-
neously with an insider trader. Section 21A provides the SEC with the authority to
seek a civil penalty against insider traders.
'0 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997) ("Under the 'tradi-
tional' or 'classical theory' of insider trading liability, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are vio-
lated when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis
of material, nonpublic information.").
" M at 652 (internal quotations omitted); see also FERRARAETAL., supra note 6, §
2.01 [1], at 2-2 to 2-3 (discussing the classical theory of insider trading).
12 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 ("The classical theory applies not only to officers,
directors, and other permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys, ac-
countants, consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corpora-
tion."); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983) (discussing how such "outsiders"
may become fiduciaries of a corporation and subject to the insider trading restric-
tions); see also FERRARA ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.01[11], at 2-3 (noting that the term "in-
siders" also refers to "quasi-insiders" such as "attorneys, investment bankers, or other
professionals working as temporary agents of the corporation").
" See Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 237-38 (discussing the "tipper-tippee theory"
of liability); see also FERRARA ET AL, supra note 6, § 2.01[1], at 2-3 ("[T]he 'tip-
1999]
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ing if the tipper breached his fiduciary duty by conveying the informa-
tion. 4
Liability under the classical theory requires a breach of an in-
sider's duty owed to the shareholders of the corporation in whose se-
curities the insider (or a tippee) traded.'5 The classical theory thus
does not impose liability where an "individual[] 'outside' a corpora-
tion purchase[s] the corporation's securities while in possession of
material, nonpublic information that was obtained in a manner that
did not involve an insider's breach of duty." 16 Such trading has been
described as "outsider trading," since the traders are outsiders of the
corporation in whose securities they traded. 7
Recognizing this limitation of the classical theory, the SEC and the
courts developed the misappropriation theory. The misappropriation
theory imposes liability where an individual "misappropriates confi-
dential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a
duty owed to the source of the information.' 8 Rather than predicat-
ing liability on a fiduciary relationship between the insider and the
corporation's shareholders, "the misappropriation theory premises
liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who en-
trusted him with access to confidential information. "19 As in the case
per' ... also incur[s] liability for insider trading, even if that corporate insider did not
personally trade."). To be liable, the tipper must have received some benefit or have
intended to make a pecuniary gift to the tippee. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 ("[T]he test
is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.
Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders.").
" See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 ("[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the sharehold-
ers of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the informa-
tion to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach.").
" See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-35 (1980) (explaining that there
can be no fraud-and therefore no liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5-absent
a duty to disclose owed to the stockholders).
16 FERRARAETAL., supra note 6, § 2.01[1], at 2-3.
17 SeeJill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 198 (1991) ("Trading of this type is frequently de-
scribed as 'outsider trading,' so denominated because the traders are outsiders with
respect to the issuer of the securities they trade.").
"' United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
'9 Id. A good example of the misappropriation theory is found in O'Hagan. In that
case the defendant O'Hagan was a partner in a law firm representing Grand Met in its
planned tender offer of Pillsbury (though O'Hagan himself did not do any work for
Grand Met). Aware of the planned tender offer, O'Hagan traded in Pillsbury options
and common stock, reaping a profit of more than $4.3 million. See id. at 647-48 (de-
scribing O'Hagan's conduct).
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of the classical theory, both tippers and tippees may be liable for in-
sider trading under the misappropriation theory.0
B. Reasons for the Insider Trading Prohibition
The traditional basis for the insider trading prohibition is the be-
lief that insider trading violates our notion of "fair play" and threatens
the integrity of the capital markets.2 As the American Bar Association
20 SeeFERRARAETAL., supra note 6, § 2.01 [11, at 2-4 ("On similar reasoning, trading
based on a 'misappropriated' tip generally triggers liability for both the tippee and the
tipper.").
21 See Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 227 (asserting that the "two ... traditional
bases for prohibitions against insider trading" are the "'fair play' and 'integrity of the
markets' arguments"). Commentators have offered several additional arguments for
the prohibitions against insider trading. See generally LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SEGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECuRnrIEs REGULATION 762 (3d ed. 1995) (asserting that because
insider-traders can profit on negative information, insider trading may create incen-
tives for insiders to act against the best interests of the corporation); Task Force Report,
supra note 6, at 228 (asserting that insider trading discourages prompt disclosure of
information since corporate insiders have an "incentive to delay [disclosure] long
enough to speculate on a stock market profit"); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider
Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market MicrostructureJustification and Optimization of
Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1, 17-46 (1993) (advocating the prohibi-
tion of insider trading by arguing that the prohibition reduces transaction costs); Roy
A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market,
53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1452 (1967) (arguing, among other things, that insider trading
subjects insiders to "a conflict of interest that may affect theirjudgment not only in the
timing of disclosure, but also in the timing of the underlying events themselves [and]
may cause such events to be created"); Bevis Longstreth, Halting Insider Trading, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1984, at A27 (summarizing the arguments against insider trading and
rebutting the arguments in favor of insider trading).
Some commentators, on the other hand, have argued that insider trading should
not be prohibited. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MARKET (1966) (attacking the wisdom of the prohibition against insider trading and
asserting that insider trading is a useful means of compensating entrepreneurs);
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 868 (1983) (arguing that insider trading promotes market efficiency since
such trading is a means of communicating information to the market and thus causes
the stock price to move to its "correct" value sooner); Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of
Insider Trading Restictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 55 (1980) (concluding that "the harm
caused by insider trading can be objectively measured and that so measured it does not
cause any detectable injury to investors"); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law
Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970) (responding to critics of his arguments in sup-
port of insider trading).
The arguments that insider trading should be permitted, however, have gained
little support in Congress. As Congressman Dingell asserted: "We strongly disagree
with those who would seek to permeate our markets with this type of fraud. The ar-
guments in favor of insider trading are rubbish." 130 CONG. REC. 20,969 (1984). And
as Senator D'Amato stated: "Some commentators have called insider trading a victim-
less crime; however, I strongly disagree .... John Fedders, the Director of the Securi-
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Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading observed:
In our society, we traditionally abhor those who refuse to play by the
rules, that is, the cheaters and the sneaks. A spitball pitcher, or a card
shark with an ace up his sleeve, may win the game but not our respect.
And if we know such a person is in the game, chances are we won't play.
These commonsense [sic] observations suggest that two of the tradi-
tional bases for prohibitions against insider tradinare still sound: the
'fair play' and 'integrity of the markets' arguments.
Underlying the development of the insider trading prohibition is
the view that insider trading is fundamentally unfair23 As Donald
Langevoort has observed, "most people who oppose insider trading
seem to believe that quite apart from any harm caused to specific in-
vestors, insider trading is simply an unfair exploitation of information
that properly belongs to someone else." 4 The unfairness stems not
from the insider-trader's possession of superior information, but from
the trader's possession of an informational advantage that other inves-
tors cannot overcome: other investors cannot acquire the inside in-
formation.u Clearly, informational advantages exist; some investors
will necessarily have superior information as a result of superior intel-• - •26
ligence, diligence, or power. And not all such informational dispari-
ties and Exchange Commission's Division of Enforcement, has stated publicly that he
believes that those who engage in insider trading are thieves, I concur wholeheartedly
with Mr. Fedders." 130 CONG REc. 20,107 (1984).
An assessment of the various arguments is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Congress and the courts have embraced the "fairness" and "integrity of the markets"
arguments, and this Comment will proceed under the assumption that such arguments
are valid.
Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 227.
23 See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961) (asserting that the "dis-
close or abstain" obligation "rests on... the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of... information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing").
24 LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 1.02[4], at 1-14.
2As Victor Brudney commented:
The unfairness is not a function merely of possessing more information - out-
siders may possess more information than other outsiders by reason of their
diligence or zeal - but of the fact that it is an advantage which cannot be
competed away since it depends upon a lawful privilege to which an outsider
cannot acquire access.
Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 346 (1979).
2 See id. at 360 ("[T]here may nevertheless be systematic inequality of lawful access
to information by reason of disparities among individual investors with respect to
power, wealth, diligence, or intelligence.");see also RonaldJ. Gilson, The Outside View of
Inside Trading N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 1987, at E23 ("In the public mind, fairness is
equated with access. From this perspective, what is unfair about insider trading is that
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27ties should be eliminated. When other investors are unable to obtain
information, however, no matter how great their resources or dili-
gence, such informational advantages are unfair,28 and it is those in-
formational advantages that the insider trading prohibition seeks to
prevent.2
it is a game that only some can play, and participation is not based on merit.").
See Brudney, supra note 25, at 353 (explaining that "the need to encourage pri-
vate pursuit of information sets limits on the persons and information subject to the
disclosure obligations of the antifraud rules"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading,
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV.
309, 323 ("[S]ometimes nondisclosure is necessary to enable people to capture the
value of information; to permit use without disclosure is to encourage the creation of
new information.").
2' SeeBrudney, supra note 25, at 354 ("[IThe essential... element which makes an
informational advantage unusable by those who possess it in dealing with those who do
not is the inability of the latter to overcome it lawfully, no matter how great may be
their diligence or large their resources.").
This is the "equality of access to information" theory. See id. at 354-55 ("This no-
tion is sometimes cast in terms of a rule seeking to effect equal access to material in-
formation for persons trading with each other."). It should be distinguished from the
"parity-of-information" theory, which suggests that all informational disparities should
be eliminated. See id. at 355 ("[V]iewed most broadly, [the equality of access to infor-
mation theory] does not extend so far as to require actual equality or sharing of in-
formation."). AsJustice Blackmun explained:
[T]here is a significant conceptual distinction between parity of information
and parity of access to material information. The latter gives free rein to cer-
tain kinds of informational advantages that the former might foreclose, such
as those that result from differences in diligence or acumen. Indeed, by limit-
ing opportunities for profit from manipulation of confidential connections or
resort to stealth, equal access helps to ensure that advantages obtained by
honest means reap their full reward.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 252 n.2 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see
also Insider Trading: Some Questions and Some Answers, 1 SEC. REG. L.J. 328, 335 (1974)
(suggesting that it is "equality of access" to information (as distinguished from "equal-
ity of information") among investors that is a goal of the antifraud provisions).
At least one commentator has argued that the insider trading laws should adopt a
parity-of-information approach. SeeJoel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities
Law ConcerningNonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1137-38 (1985) (arguing that a
parity-of-information rule "has clear advantages" including the fact that it is a "bright
line rule" that would "reassure investors that the securities markets generally prohibit
information advantages").
The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the parity-of-information theory. See
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 ("[N]either the Congress nor the Commission ever has
adopted a parity-of-information rule."). Chiarella also cast doubt upon the equal access
theory, predicating liability on a fiduciary duty to shareholders. See id. at 231-33 (argu-
ing that a duty to "disclose or abstain" exists only where the insider has a fiduciary duty
to shareholders). The Supreme Court also appeared to reject the equal access theory
in United States v. O'Hagan, asserting that a fiduciary could potentially avoid liability by
disclosing to the source of the information his plans to trade. See United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) ("[Flull disclosure forecloses liability under the
1999]
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In addition to-or perhaps because of-this fundamental unfair-
ness, insider trading threatens the capital markets. The strength and
stability of the capital markets depend on investor confidence in those
marketsYs Insider trading, however, undermines investors' expecta-
tions of honest and fair securities markets. 3' If investors believe that
other market participants have an unerodable informational advan-
tage-that the markets are not fair-they will be reluctant to partici-
pate in the securities markets:
A rational buyer (or seller) in a market, who knows that the person with
whom he is dealing has material information about the value of the
product being exchanged which he could not lawfully acquire, will ei-
ther refrain from dealing with that transactor or demand a risk pre-
mium. If the market is thought to be systematically populated with such
transactors some investors will refrain from dealing altogether, and oth-
ers will incur costs to avoid dealing with such transactors or corruptly to
overcome their unerodable informational advantages.
misappropriation theory... if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to
trade on the nonpublic information, there is no...
§ 10(b) violation."). This assertion implicitly rejects the equal access theory, for even if
the fiduciary disclosed his trading plans to the source of the information, he would still
have an informational advantage that could not lawfully be overcome by other inves-
tors. But see Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (endorsing the equal
access theory, asserting that "I would hold that persons having access to confidential
material information that is not legally available to others generally are prohibited by
Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural informational advan-
tage through trading in affected securities").
'o See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275
("Capital formation and our nation's economic growth and stability depend on inves-
tor confidence in the fairness and integrity of our capital markets.").
3, See id. ("Insider trading threatens [the capital] markets by undermining the pub-
lic's expectations of honest and fair securities markets where all participants play by
the same rules."); see also LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 1.02[4], at 1-15 ("Confidence in
the securities marketplace ... is diminished if shareholders believe that only those 'in
the know' can profit in the stock market.").
32 Brudney, supra note 25, at 356; see also Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforce-
ment Legislation, Hearing on H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Consumer Protec-
lion and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerc4 98th Cong. 35 (1983) [here-
inafter House Hearings] (statement ofJohn M. Fedders, SEC Director of Enforcement)
("[I]f we permit [insider trading] I think it would erode investor confidence in the
marketplace and they may very well flee the marketplace and choose other invest-
ments, which would hurt the liquidity of the exchanges, the liquidity of the market-
place, and eventually the capital structure of our country."); H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at
8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6045 ("[T]he small investor will be-and
has been-reluctant to invest in the market if he feels it is rigged against him."); Task
Force Report, supra note 6, at 227-28 ("Although [we] know[] of no empirical research
that directly demonstrates that concerns about integrity affect market activity, both
authoritative commentators and common sense tell us that if investors do not antici-
pate fair treatment, they will avoid investing in securities [and] capital forma-
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It is this recognition that underlies the insider trading prohibi-
tions.3s Indeed, as SEC Enforcement Director William R. McLucas as-
serted, "one of the purposes of bringing an insider trading case, in
addition to addressing specific instances of fraud, is to ensure the in-
tegrity of the market." 4
II. THE "POSSESSION VERSUS USE" DEBATE
Although Congress has condemned insider trading and expressed
strong support for the prohibition of such conduct, s Congress has re-
sisted attempts to expressly define insider trading.m Instead, the pro-
hibition against insider trading has developed solely from judicial
(and administrative) interpretation of the anti-fraud provisions of sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 101>5. The lack of a statutory definition of the
insider trading offense has led to some ambiguity regarding the type
of conduct that is prohibited 7 One such area of ambiguity is whether
the insider's motivation for trading is relevant to a determination of
insider-trading liability under Rule 101>5. At issue is whether section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 require a causal connection between the mate-
rial, nonpublic information and the insider's trading-that is, a show-
ion.. will become less attractive and more difficult.").
The central purpose of the federal securities laws is "to insure the maintenance
of fair and honest markets." 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994); see also 130 CONG. REC. 20, 109
(1984) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (describing the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984 as "much needed legislation to deter insider trading, a market abuse which
threatens investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of our capital markets").
William R. McLucas & Alma M. Angotti, Insider Trading. Is It Back or Did It Ever
Really Go Away?, INSIGHTS, Oct. 1995, at 2, 8.
See supra note 21 (quoting statements by Congressman Dingell and Senator
D'Amato as representative of Congress's support for the prohibition against insider
trading).
See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 13-14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,
2286-87 (explaining that Congress decided not to define insider trading). The SEC
has also been reluctant to define insider trading. See 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFEI., supra
note 6, § 7.4(610), at 7:160.4 ("Congress and the SEC strongly resisted pleas from the
bar to define insider trading."); William R. McLucas et al., Common Sense, Fexibility, and
Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 51 Bus. LAw. 1221, 1235 n.71 (1996) (noting
that the SEC submitted a proposed definition of insider trading to Congress in 1987
despite the SEC's historical position "that a codified definition... was unnecessary and
indeed, counterproductive," but explaining further that legislative efforts to define
insider trading have nonetheless been unsuccessful).
37 See Fisch, supra note 17, at 179-80 & n.5 (asserting that "the legal restrictions on
trading securities while in possession of material nonpublic information are confused
and confusing" and that "the legal uncertainty has been attributed to the absence of a
statute defining the prohibited conduct"); see also SZOCIYJ, supra note 9, at 1, 105 (re-
ferring to the "vagueness" of the insider trading prohibition).
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ing that the insider actually used the information in making his deci-
sion to trade-or whether knowing possession of such information at
the time of the trade is sufficient for liability.ss The SEC, as well as
some legal commentators, have advocated a "knowing possession"
standard, arguing that the insider's motivation for trading is largely
irrelevant.39 Other commentators, however, have advocated a "use"
Although organizations can be subject to insider trading liability under the In-
sider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 ("ITSFEA"), Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), see,
e.g., H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044 (ex-
plaining that the bill "expand[s] the scope of civil penalties remedies to 'controlling
persons' who fail to take adequate steps to prevent insider trading"), the "possession
versus use" debate has focused primarily on trading by individuals, rather than by or-
ganizations. Although one might argue that the debate should include corporate trad-
ing, a discussion of corporate trading is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Organizations frequently trade while in possession of material, nonpublic informa-
tion-often one department of an organization will trade while another department
possesses inside information about the traded securities. See John H. Sturc &
Catharine W. Cummer, Possession vs. Use for Insider Trading Liability, INSIGHTS, June
1998, at 3, 7 (explaining that a "common situation is that of an institutional investor
with separate departments, one of which may possess material nonpublic information
and another which engages in trading"). But such organizations may avoid liability-
even under a "knowing possession" standard-by erecting a "Chinese Wall," which is
essentially a set of policies and procedures designed to prevent the communication of
information between departments. See Marc I. Steinberg &John Fletcher, Compliance
Programs for Insider Trading; 47 SMU L. REV. 1783, 1803-04 (1994) ("Chinese Wall pro-
cedures consist of policies and procedures designed to control the flow of material,
nonpublic information within a multiservice financial firm."). If a Chinese Wall is in
place, inside information possessed by individuals on one side of the wall will not be
imputed to those on the other side of the wall who are engaged in trading activities.
See Horwich, supra note 5, at 1238 ("This [lack of imputation] is understood to free the
organization to trade even if trading 'while in possession' of inside information is un-
lawful."). Although few courts have addressed whether a Chinese Wall can be used by
an organization to avoid federal securities liability, the SEC explicitly approved the use
of Chinese Walls when it adopted Rule 14e-3. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b) (1999)
(providing a safe harbor for organizations implementing Chinese Wall procedures
provided it can be shown that the "individual(s) making the investment decision on
behalf of the [organization] ... did not know the material, nonpublic information");
Steinberg & Fletcher, supra, at 1810-12 (discussing judicial and administrative treat-
ment of Chinese Walls).
39 See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1332-33 (1lth Cir. 1998) (noting that the SEC
claimed that "knowing possession of material, nonpublic information while trading is
sufficient to establish liability" and that the SEC argued that evidence that the defen-
dant knowingly possessed material, nonpublic information at the time of his trade was
sufficient to impose insider trading liability, regardless of whether or not the defen-
dant used the inside information); FERRARA ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.01 [5], at 2-14.6 to
2-14.8 (implicitly endorsing the "knowing possession" standard-at least under the
classical theory of insider trading liability); LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-23
to 3-27 (suggesting that "knowing possession" is the appropriate test); 7 Louis Loss &
JOEL SEUGMAN, SECURrnEs REGULATION 3505 (3d ed. 1991) (advocating the "knowing
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standard, arguing that a causal connection between the inside infor-
mation and the insider's trading activity is required.40
In many insider trading cases, the difference between these two
standards is irrelevant, since it is clear that the insider traded on the
basis of the material, nonpublic information.4 ' The issue can become
important, however, in certain situations. Consider, for example, the
following situation:
The chief financial officer [("CFO")] of a publicly held company has
consistently bought shares (in the range of 2,000 to 5,000 shares) in his
company during a two- or three-day window period beginning the day af-
ter the filing of the company's quarterly report on Form 10-Q. Based on
the advice of house counsel, this timing was intended to protect the CFO
from any charges that he possessed non-public information. But in the
instant case, the day after the filing of its Form 10-Q the company (and
its senior officers) become aware of a lucrative merger proposal from a
well-financed acquirer. Knowing that such a merger was under negotia-
tion, the CFO still buys his more-or-less customary 5,000 shares (and
thereby profits handsomely when the nonpublic proposal is eventually
announced) .
In this situation, the CFO's liability for insider trading may de-
pend upon whether the "knowing possession" or the "use" standard is
employed. Under the SEC's "knowing possession" test, the CFO will
be liable for insider trading-regardless of the fact that he always buys
shares after the company files its quarterly report and regardless of his
motivation for his current purchase of shares. Under the "use" test,
however, the CFO will escape liability as long as his decision to buy
shares was not based on his knowledge of the contemplated merger-
possession" standard); Oriana N. Li, Note, United States v. Smith: The Use-Possession
Debate in SEC Enforcement Actions Under § 10(b), 74 WASH. L. REV. 395, 401-24 (1999)
(arguing that the Ninth Circuit erred in Smith by rejecting the "knowing possession"
standard).
40 See 2 BROMBERG & LOwENFELs, supra note 6, § 7.4(610) to (620), at 7:160.1 to
7:160.13 (advocating the "use" standard); Christopher J. Bebel, A Detailed Analysis of
United States v. O'Hagan: Onward Through the Evolution of the Federal Securities Laws, 59
LA. L. REV. 1, 50-53 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court's opinion in O'Hagan
supports a "use" standard); Horwich, supra note 5, at 1268-76 (discussing numerous
factors which "all point in favor of a use component"); Bryan C. Smith, Comment, Pos-
session Vensus Use: Reconciling the Letter and Spirit of Insider Trading Regulation Under Rule
10b-5, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 371, 381-86 (1999) (arguing that the policy considerations
underlying the insider trading prohibition support a "use" standard).
41 See LANGEvOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-22 ("In the typical case, there is no
question that the insider traded in order to take advantage of material nondisclosed
information.").
John C. Coffee, Jr., Outsider Trading After O'Hagan, CORP. COUNSELLOR, Dec.
1997, at 6, 16.
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as long as this information was not a factor in his decision to purchase
the shares. In this context, then, the "possession versus use" debate
may be quite important.
Attempting to resolve this debate, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
recently held that "knowing possession" is not sufficient to impose in-
sider trading liability.4 This Part will discuss the "possession versus
use" debate, exploring both the origins of the debate and the recent
cases addressing the issue.
A. Origins of the Debate
Federal insider trading case law can be traced back to the SEC's
seminal opinion in Cady, Roberts & Co., in which the SEC concluded
that insider trading constitutes "fraud or deceit" and thus violates Rule
lOb-5.44 In so doing, the SEC articulated the oft-cited "disclose or ab-
'3 See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e reject the
government's proffered 'knowing possession' standard for insider trading violations
.... "), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 804 (1999); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir.
1998) ("[M]ere knowing possession... is not a perseviolation.").
44 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961) (asserting that the conduct of a broker who traded on
the basis of material, nonpublic information violated Rule lOb-5). Cady, Roberts was not
the first case to hold that section 10(b) and Rule 101-5 prohibit insider trading. Sev-
eral years earlier, in Kardn v. National Gypsum Co., a federal district court reached a
similar conclusion, see 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (holding defendant corpo-
rate officers and directors liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because they
"fail[ed) to disclose a fact coming to their knowledge by reason of their position,
which ... materially affect[ed] the judgment of the other party to the transaction"),
and other courts followed suit. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.02(1], at 2-14.9
("Since Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. in 1947, courts have adopted the position that
Section 10(b) ... and Rule 10b-5 require corporate insiders such as officers and direc-
tors to abstain from trading in their own corporation's securities unless they have dis-
closed all material nonpublic information."). But Kardon and other cases preceding
Cady, Roberts involved face-to-face transactions between insiders and stockholders, not
impersonal transactions on a securities exchange. See id. at 2-15 (explaining that "Kar-
don and other early cases... involved only face-to-face transactions between corporate
officers and shareholders" and that "Cady, Roberts was... the first case in which Rule
10b-5 was interpreted by the SEC to ban all securities trading based on misuse of cor-
porate information, including market transactions consummated through an imper-
sonal securities market").
Long before the adoption of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, state common law dealt
with insider trading. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal
and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 37-39 (1986) (discussing the history of the
insider trading prohibition under state common law). Courts adopted several differ-
ent approaches to insider trading, but in general, insider trading was prohibited only
in the case of face-to-face transactions with shareholders or others to whom the insider
owed a fiduciary duty-no duty of disclosure existed for impersonal securities exchange
transactions. See id. at 38 ("[The insider trading rules] applied only where the insider
engaged in face-to-face transactions with existing shareholders. In exchange transac-
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stain rule," asserting that an insider is required to disclose material,
nonpublic information or abstain from trading.4 The Second Circuit
embraced this rule in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., holding that "any-
one in possession of material inside information must either disclose
it to the investing public, or if he is disabled from disclosing it... or
he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommend-
ing the securities concerned while such inside information remains
undisclosed."
4
Courts and commentators, however, have failed to reach a con-
sensus on the correct interpretation of the "disclose or abstain" rule.
To some, the rule suggests that mere possession of nonpublic infor-
mation is sufficient to establish insider trading liability, and the rule
has in fact been cited for such a proposition.4 7 Others have insisted
that the maxim "disclose or abstain" fails to "capture the complexity of
the idea that [it is] supposed to represent," and have argued that it
"enjoins not all trading, but [only] trading on the basis of material non-
public information
"48
tions, the uniform rule was that no duty of disclosure existed.").
Indeed, before the federal securities legislation was enacted in 1934, "insider trad-
ing was tacitly viewed as a perk for corporate executives." SzocMJ, supra note 9, at 5.
"[M]any, if not most, of America's great fortunes accumulated at the end of the 19th
century and the beginning of the 20th were built with information-about pending
government contracts, disasters, wars, new inventions or techniques-that was not
available to the public at large." MORTON SHULMAN, THE BILLION DOLLAR WINDFALL
122 (1970).
45 See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911 (asserting that "insiders must disclose material
facts" but that if "disclosure... would be improper or unrealistic... the alternative is
to forego the transaction"); id. at 914 ("If purchasers on an exchange had available
material information known by a selling insider, we may assume that their investment
judgment would be affected and their decision whether to buy might accordingly be
modified. Consequently, any sales by the insider must await disclosure of the informa-
tion.").
16 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). The "disclose or abstain" rule was ultimately
validated by the Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1980)
(citing with approval the SEC's assertion in Cady, Roberts that an insider has an obliga-
tion to disclose material, nonpublic information or abstain from trading). Texas Gulf
Sulphurarguably went further than Cady, Roberts and Chiarella by advocating a parity-of-
information approach. See supra note 29 (discussing the parity-of-information theory).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[A] 'know-
ing possession' standard comports with the oft-quoted maxim that one with a fiduciary
or similar duty to hold material, nonpublic information in confidence must either 'dis-
close or abstain' with regard to trading."); Horwich, supra note 5, at 1240 (explaining
that Cady, Roberts can be read in support of a "knowing possession" test).
's United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1998). In reaching the
conclusion that the "disclose or abstain" rule was meant to prohibit insiders from using
nonpublic information when trading, not to enjoin trading merely because the insider
possesses nonpublic information, the Smith court made two observations. The court
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Even the SEC appears to have wavered in its interpretation of the
"disclose or abstain" rule. Despite the assertion by SEC Enforcement
Director William K McLucas that the Commission has always advo-
cated "knowing possession" as the appropriate rule for insider trading
liability,49 the SEC has been inconsistent in its interpretation of the
rule. In Investors Management Co., for example, the SEC effectively en-
dorsed a "use" requirement, asserting that a requisite element for in-
sider trading liability is "that the information be a factor in [the] deci-
sion to effect the transaction."' ° The SEC continued to explain:
"[W]here a transaction... is effected by the recipient [of material,
nonpublic information] prior to its public dissemination, an inference
arises that the information was ... a factor. The recipient of course
may seek to overcome such inference by countervailing evidence."'
But in Sterling Drug, Inc., the SEC rejected the "use" requirement sug-
gested by Investors Management and instead endorsed the "knowing
possession" standard, asserting:
The Commission... believes that Rule lOb-5 ... does not require a
showing that an insider sold his securities for the purpose of taking ad-
vantage of material non-public information.... If an insider sells his se-
curities while in possession of material adverse non-public information,
such an insider is taking advantage of his position to the detriment of
noted that in Cady, Roberts, it was clear that "the suspected insider traders had, in fact,
used inside information in consummating their trades." Id. at 1069. The court further
noted that "the SEC premised its decision, at least in part, dn the proposition that '[a]
significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that the use of inside
information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office.'" Id.
(citing Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15). See also Horwich, supra note 5, at 1239-40
("Based on this language and the cited support for it, the essence of the violation of
rule l0b-5 would appear to be making affirmative use of the infbrmation for personal
advantage.").
49 See McLucas & Angotti, supra note 34, at 4 ("The Commission has always taken
the position that once a person learns of, or 'comes into possession of,' material in-
formation, that person must either disclose the information or abstain from trading.").
50 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971).
-" Id. at 646-47. There was little evidence, however, that the transactions at issue in
this case were not motivated by inside information. See id. at 647 n.28 ("The examiner
rejected contentions by various of the respondents that their sales of... stock were
motivated by factors other than the... information."). In a concurring opinion,
Commissioner Smith recommended a stricter test, asserting that "the information
must be shown... to have substantially contributed to the trading which occurred."
Id. at 651. Commissioner Smith explained that he did "not read [the majority's] re-
quirement that the information be 'a factor' as, for instance, encompassing situations
where a firm decision to effect a transaction had clearly been made prior to the receipt
of the information and the information played no substantial role in the investment
decision." Id.
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the public.5
2
In neither of these opinions, however, did the SEC articulate a ra-
tionale for its position. 3 The SEC's seemingly abrupt and unex-
plained shift in position has served only to exacerbate the ambiguity
and has made some reluctant to accord much deference to the Com-
mission's position that "knowing possession" is the appropriate test!e
B. Recent Cases Addressing the "Possession Versus Use"Debate
More recently, three federal circuit courts have expressly exam-
ined the issue of "possession versus use."
1. The Possession Standard: United States v. Teicher
The first case to discuss carefully the "possession versus use" de-
bate was United States v. Teicher.55 In Teicher, the defendants argued
that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that the defen-
dants could be found guilty of insider trading if they possessed mate-
rial, nonpublic information at the time of their trades, regardless of
whether this information was the actual cause of those trades. 3 Al-
52 Sterling Drug, Inc., 14 S.E.C. Docket 824, 827 (1978). In SterlingDrug three di-
rectors accused of insider trading maintained that they had decided to sell stock in the
company prior to obtaining the inside information. One director presented documen-
tary evdence that he had formed an intention to sell prior to obtaining the informa-
tion and testified that he sold stock because he had retired from his position and
wished to diversify his investments. The other two directors testified that they sold
stock to satisfy various obligations. See id. at 827 (discussing the directors' testimony
regarding their reasons for selling stock).
53 The SEC did not cite any authority for its assertion in Sterling Drug, nor did the
SEC reference its opinion in Investors Management
See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (explaining that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has declined to accord much deference to the SEC's position regarding the "pos-
session versus use" debate since the SEC's position has not been consistent over time).
-" 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993). SeeLANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-23 ("The
first extensive judicial discussion of this issue is found in... United States v. Teicher.").
The case has also been referred to as the "leading case" in support of the "knowing
possession" standard. Horwich, supra note 5, at 1250.
Teicher, 987 F.2d at 119 (discussing the defendants' arguments). The district
court instructed the jury:
The government need not prove a causal relationship between the misappro-
priated material nonpublic information and the defendants' trading. That is,
the government need not prove that the defendants purchased or sold securi-
ties because of the material nonpublic information that they knowingly pos-
sessed. It is sufficient if the government proves that the defendants purchased
or sold securities while knowingly in possession of the material nonpublic in-
formation.
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though merely dicta, the Second Circuit expressly rejected the "use"
requirement advocated by the defendants and instead endorsed a
"knowing possession" standardY. The court began by observing that
"Rule 14e-3, which prohibits fraud in connection with tender offers
explicitly provides a 'knowing possession' standard.' The court then
set forth three factors in support of its position.59
First, the Teicher court stated that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 re-
quire only that a deceptive practice be conducted "'in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security.'" 8 The court noted that the phrase
"in connection with" has been construed quite flexibly, suggesting
that such an interpretation supports the more flexible and less restric-
Id.
57 See id. at 120-21 (rejecting the defendants' arguments and asserting that "a num-
ber of factors weigh in favor of a 'knowing possession' standard"). The court's adop-
tion of the "knowing possession" standard was dicta since the court found it "unneces-
sary to determine whether proof of securities fraud requires a causal connection,
because any alleged defect in the instruction was harmless beyond doubt." Id. at 121.
58 Id. at 120. Rule 14e-3 provides in relevantpart:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence.., a ten-
der offer,... it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act
or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for any other
person who is in possession of material information relating to such tender
offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and
which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indi-
rectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought. .. by such tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting
on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or
sell.., such securities... unless within a reasonable time prior to any
purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed
by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1999).
The applicability of Rule 14e-3's "knowing possession" standard to the "possession
versus use" debate is somewhat questionable. In section 14(e), Congress expressly gave
the SEC the power to define fraud: "The Commission shall, for the purposes of this
subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1998). The SEC's definition of fraud contained in Rule 14e-3 may
not be transferable to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 fraud.
-9 See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120-21. In addition to the factors discussed, the court also
asserted that the SEC's interpretation of Rule 1Ob-5 is "entitled to some consideration."
Id. at 120. Citing SterlingDru, Inc., the court noted that the SEC has "consistently en-
dorsed [the view] that a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 occurs when a trade is
conducted in 'knowing possession' of material nonpublic information obtained in
breach of a fiduciary or similar duty." Id. For a discussion of SterlingDrug, Inc., see su-
pra note 52 and accompanying text.
60 Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120 (quoting section 10(b) and Rule 101-5).
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tive "knowing possession" standard.6
Second, the court argued that the "disclose or abstain" rule sup-
ports the "knowing possession" standard.62 The court explained that if
an insider is in possession of material, nonpublic information and he
chooses not to disclose such information, he must abstain from trad-
ing.6
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, the court recommended
the "knowing possession" standard because it is simple to apply, re-
quiring only a determination of whether the trader possessed mate-
rial, nonpublic information.6 The "use" standard, on the other hand,
requires factual inquiries into the state of mind and motivations of the
trader.66 The court further suggested that it would be unlikely that in-
formation possessed by a trader would not in some way influence his
trades. As the court explained:
Unlike a loaded weapon which may stand ready but unused, material in-
formation can not lay idle in the human brain. The individual with such
information may decide to trade upon that information, to alter a previ-
ously decided-upon transaction, to continue with a previously planned
transaction even though publicly available information would now sug-
gest otherwise, or simply to do nothing.66
The court believed that a "use" standard would pose difficulties of
proof for the SEC or the government and would "frustrate attempts to
distinguish between legitimate trades and those conducted in connec-
tion with inside information."67
6' See id. at 120 ("We have previously stated that the 'in connection with' clause
must be 'construed... flexibly to include deceptive practices 'touching' the sale of
securities, a relationship which has been described as 'very tenuous .... '"(quoting
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981))); see alSOLANGEVOORT, supra
note 4, § 3.04, at 3-23 (explaining that the Teicher court believed that "the possession
standard better comports with the view that Rule 10b-5 should be read flexibly, not
restrictively").
62 See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120 ("[A] 'knowing possession' standard comports with
the oft-quoted maxim that one with a fiduciary or similar duty to hold material non-
public information in confidence must either 'disclose or abstain' with regard to trad-
ing.").
See id. ("When the ... insider.., is not in a position to make a public an-
nouncement, [he] must abstain.").
See id ("Finally, a 'knowing possession' standard has the attribute of simplicity.").
' See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.01[5], at 2-14.6 (explaining that the Teicher
court believed that "a 'use' test would entail significant factual inquiries into the state
of mind and the motivations of the insider trader").
Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120.
67 RL at 121.
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2. The Use Standard: SEC v. Adler and United States v. Smith
Although Teicher devoted considerable attention to the "posses-
sion versus use" debate, the Second Circuit's discussion was merely
dicta.6e The first circuit court to directly confront the issue was the
Eleventh Circuit in SEC v. Adler.' In that case, the district court effec-
tively adopted a "use" standard for insider trading, granting summary
judgment for one of the defendants because he had a preexisting plan
to sell stock.70 On appeal, the SEC argued that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment, asserting that the defendant know-
ingly possessed material, nonpublic information and that such know-
ing possession was sufficient for liability.7' Viewing the choice between
the "possession" and "use" standards as "a difficult and close question
of first impression," the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "the use test
is the appropriate test. "7n The court asserted, however, that an "infer-
ence of use ... arises from the fact that an insider traded while in pos-
session of inside information. "7
Acknowledging that the Supreme Court's language in several
cases was merely dicta, the Adler court nonetheless felt that its "use"
test "best comports with the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and
with Supreme Court precedent."74 The court noted, for example, the
"use" language employed throughout the Supreme Court's opinions
in Chiarella v. United States,75 Dirks v. SEC,76 and United States v.
O'Hagan7 The court also asserted that the Supreme Court's language
in those opinions "repeatedly emphasized [a] focus on fraud and de-
ception,"78 and argued that a "knowing possession" test fails to embody
such a focus: "[W]e do not believe that the SEC's knowing possession
test would always and inevitably be limited to situations involving
68 See supra note 57 (explaining why the court's discussion was dicta).
69 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
70 See id. at 1332 (explaining that the district court granted summary judgment for
one of the defendants because his "preexisting plan to sell stock rebutted any reason-
able inference of scienter").
71 See id. ("The SEC argues that it presented evidence that [the defendant] know-
ingly possessed material nonpublic information, and thus ... violated the prohibition
against insider trading .....
72 Id. at 1337.
7 Id.
71 Id. at 1338.
75 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
76 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
78 Adler, 137 F.3d at 1338.
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fraud."7
The Adler court found support for its position in other cases as
well. Citing cases including In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation,0
the court noted that several other courts "have allowed insiders to in-
troduce evidence of preexisting plans or other 'innocuous' reasons
for sales in order to" escape liability.81
Furthermore, although the SEC advocated a "knowing possession"
standard, the court refused to defer to the SEC's position.82 The Adler
court asserted that the SEC position had not been consistent, noting
that in Investors ManagemeniP the SEC appeared to support a "use" test,
but that in SterlingDrus the SEC adopted a "knowing possession" test
without providing any rationale for the change.8s The court also ob-
served that although the SEC had expressly adopted a "knowing pos-
session" standard in the context of tender offers with Rule 14 e-3,ss the
SEC had not amended Rule 10b-5 or promulgated other rules adopt-
ing the "knowing possession" test for the more general case of insider
trading.s
Finally, the court considered the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984. Although acknowledging that Congress used the phrase "in
possession of' in the statute, the court nonetheless concluded that the
79 Id.
835 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Worlds of Wonder].
81 Ader, 137 F.3d at 1335.
82 See id. at 1339 ("We decline to accord much deference to the SEC position
44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
14 S.E.C. Docket 824 (1978).
See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1339 (explaining that the SEC's position regarding the
"possession versus use" debate has not been consistent over time); see also supra notes
50-52 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC's positions in Investors Management
and SterlingDrug).
"Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading in securities while in possession of material, non-
public information, if such securities are being sought (or will be sought) in a tender
offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1999) (providing that "it shall constitute a fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative act or practice.., for [a] person who is in possession of ma-
terial [nonpublic] information relating to [a] tender offer.., to purchase or
sell... such securities"); supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 14e-3).
See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1339 ("[A]Ithough the SEC has adopted such a rule in the
context of tender offers, it has not formally adopted the knowing possession test for
insider trading."). Some have questioned the SEC's ability to promulgate such a rule
under section 10(b). See Sturc & Cummer, supra note 38, at 6 (asserting that the Adler
court's "assumption about the SEC's rulemaking authority is questionable," because
"Section 10(b) does not give the SEC the same authority to make rules 'reasonably de-
signed to prevent' any acts and practices which may violate the statute as does Section
14(e), but rather only the authority to proscribe the deceptive devices themselves").
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"language of [the Insider Trading Sanctions Act] does not resolve
whether possession or use is the proper standard for an insider trad-
ing violation.'ss
The court noted that "[t]he strongest argument that has been ar-
ticulated in support of the knowing possession test is that a strict use
test would pose serious difficulties of proof for the SEC."8 Agreeing
that a trader's motivations are often difficult to prove, the court held
that an "inference of use... arises from the fact that the insider
traded while in knowing possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion."90 The Adler court asserted that such an inference would be suf-
ficient to alleviate the problems of proof.9
Shortly after the Eleventh Circuit addressed the "possession versus
use" debate, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in United States v.
Smith.92 The Smith court agreed with much of the reasoning in AdleW
3
and adopted the "use" standard.94 Because Smith involved a criminal
prosecution, however, the court stopped short of Adler's holding that
an inference of use arises when the insider trades while in possession
of material, nonpublic information: "[W]e deal here with a criminal
prosecution, not a civil enforcement proceeding, as was the situation
in Adler. We are therefore not at liberty, as was the Adler court, to es-
tablish an evidentiary presumption that gives rise to an inference of
use."
95
Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337; see also infra Part II.C (discussing the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act and Congress's role in the "possession versus use" debate).
89 Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337.
90 Id.; see also id. ("[Wihen an insider trades while in possession of material non-
public information, a strong inference arises that such information was used by the
insider in trading. The insider can attempt to rebut the inference by adducing evi-
dence that there was no causal connection between the information and the trade
...... )
91 Id. ("[W]e believe that the SEC's problems [with respect to proof] are suffi-
ciently alleviated by the inference of use....").
155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
93 See id. at 1068 (agreeing with the Adler court that "a 'use' requirement [is] more
consistent with the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which emphasizes 'manipula-
tion,' 'deception,' and 'fraud'"); id ("Like our colleagues on the Eleventh Circuit, we
are concerned that the SEC's 'knowing possession' standard would not be-indeed,
could not be-strictly limited to those situations actually involving intentional fraud.").
See id. at 1069 (holding that Rule 10b-5 requires the government to "demon-
strate that the suspected inside[r] trader actually used material nonpublic information
in consummating his transaction").
95 Id.
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C. Congressional Role in the Debate
Congress also appeared to weigh in on the "possession versus use"
debate when it enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
("ITSA"). 9 The major purpose of the ITSA was to increase the sanc-
tions for insider trading by creating a new civil penalty.97 In creating
the new civil penalty, however, Congress explicitly adopted a "posses-
sion" standard: the SEC may seek the civil penalty from any person
who violates a rule or statutory provision by "purchasing or selling a
security while in possession ofmaterial, nonpublic information.",
When it adopted the ITSA, Congress expressly declined to define
insider trading. 9 Nonetheless, during the hearings on the proposed
legislation, Congress examined the "possession versus use" debate, en-
tertaining testimony from various witnesses regarding the appropriate
standard. Several witnesses urged that Congress employ "use" lan-
guage, arguing that the "possession" standard was inappropriate and
Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2274
(describing the purpose of the ITSA). Prior to the enactment of the 1TSA, the only
remedies available to the SEC for insider trading violations were injunctions against
future violations and disgorgement orders, requiring defendants to pay the profits
gained (or losses avoided). See Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The Insider Trading Sanctions
Act: Some Unfinished Business Ahead, NAT'L hJ., Oct. 15, 1984, at 18 (discussing the
remedies available to the SEC prior to the passage of the ITSA). The ITSA created ad-
ditional remedies, giving the SEC the authority to seek a civil penalty of up to three
times the amount of profit gained or loss avoided from insider trading. The statute
also increased the maximum fine for a criminal violation (not necessarily limited to
insider trading) from $10,000 to $100,000. See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 1 (summariz-
ing the ITSA).
3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21A(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (a) (1) (1994)
(emphasis added). Note that four years later, Congress employed the same "posses-
sion" language in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
("ITSFEA'), Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.). See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (a)
(1994) ("Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules or regula-
tions thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, non-
public information shall be liable...." (emphasis added)).
9See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 13-14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,
2286-87 (explaining that the Committee decided not to define insider trading in the
new legislation). Some congressional witnesses suggested that Congress should define
insider trading. Congress, however, resisted such pleas, arguing that because the in-
sider trading law was "sufficiently well-deveoped. .. to provide adequate guidance," a
definition was not needed and that a definition could reduce flexibility and create new
ambiguities. Id. at 13; see also 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFEiS, supra note 6, § 7.4(610), at
7:160.4 ("Congress and the SEC strongly resisted pleas from the bar to define insider
trading.").
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could subject defendants to the new penalty even if their motives for
trading were innocent.' ° The SEC, on the other hand, advocated the
"possession" standard.11
Advocates of the "use" standard have argued that the ITSA's "pos-
session" language does not resolve the "possession versus use" debate,
asserting that the ITSA does not define the insider trading violation
and merely sets "a condition for the SEC to seek the civil penalty
which is discretionary with the court and which is implicitly depend-
ent on the court finding a violation."0 2 They argue that the "posses-
sion" standard is a "necessary condition for the civil penalty," but that
Congress did not intend for "possession" to be "a sufficient condition
for the penalty, much less for the violation."03 These advocates con-
tend that by employing the "possession" language, Congress chose not
to involve itself in the "possession versus use" debate, leaving it to the
courts to decide whether insider trading violations require use of ma-
terial, nonpublic information or whether mere possession is suffi-
cient'l 4 Their arguments appear to be supported by the testimony of
"0 See The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearing on H.R. 559 Before the Sub-
comm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 116
(1984) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Faith Colish, attorney) (asserting
that "it is important to distinguish between possession and use of [inside] informa-
tion"); id. at 126 (statement of the Securities Industry Association) (explaining that
"[t]he legislation should.., be couched in terms of trading 'on the basis of' covered
information"); House Hearings, supra note 32, at 196-98 (statement of Arnold S. Jacobs,
attorney) (asserting that the "use," not the "possession" standard reflects the insider
trading case law); id. at 296-97 (statement of the New York State Bar Association Com-
mittee on Securities Regulation) (explaining that "the critical conduct is not the pur-
chase or sale of a security 'while in the possession' of material non-public information;
rather, it is the purchase or sale of a security 'on the basis' of material non-public in-
formation"); see also 2 BROMBERG & LowENFELs, supra note 6, § 7.4(610), at 7:160.3
("Congress chose the 'possession' language despite objections from a number of wit-
nesses that it was incorrect or inappropriate."); Stevenson, supra note 97, at 18 ("Sev-
eral congressional witnesses urged that this [possession] language be amended to limit
the penalty's applicability to people who traded 'on the basis of' material non-public
information.").
10 See House Hearings, supra note 32, at 48 (statement of Daniel L. Goelzer, SEC
General Counsel) (asserting that "possession of material inside information is the
test").
102 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 6, § 7.4(610), at 7:160.3; see also SEC v.
Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998) (adopting this argument).
103 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 6, § 7.4(610), at 7:160.4.
'" See Stevenson, supra note 97, at 20 (suggesting that Congress did not employ the
"on the basis of" language in the ITSA because it "chose not to enroll itself in resolving
definitional nuances"); see also WLIAM KLS. WANG & MARc I. STEINBERG, INSIDER
TRADING § 4.4.5, at 184 (1996) ("Choice of the phrase 'while in possession of' could be
either an endorsement of the broader [possession] standard or a refusal to choose be-
tween the two standards."); StuartJ. Kaswell, An Insider's Niew of the Insider Trading and
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SEC Director of Enforcement, John M. Fedders. When the Commit-
tee was considering the "possession versus use" issue, Fedders ex-
plained:
The proposed legislation in my view goes to a remedy. It does not atthe
present time at all impact the existing case law with regard to insider
trading. It is strictly a remedy saying that if a person engages in this in-
sider trading, however defined, that then the amount of disgorgement
can be three times the ill-gained profit. And the proposed language that
you have before you, presented by the Commission, does not impact the
"based on," "in possession of," or a "knowing" standard at all.
105
But Professor Langevoort has argued that, although Congress
chose not to define insider trading, it did endorse the "possession"
standard. Noting that Congress examined the "possession versus
use" debate and heard testimony on both sides of the issue,
Langevoort argues that Congress was well aware of the implications of
its decision to include the "possession" language. 7
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 BUS. LAw. 145, 158 n.57 (1989) (explaining
that the ITSFEA's "possession" language "did not mean that [Congress] endorsed a
'possession' standard" because "[t]his language had appeared in ITSA and [Congress]
simply replicated existing language," and asserting that "this legislation was entirely
neutral with respect to the debate over the possession standard").
1o House Hearings, supra note 32, at 49 (statement ofJohn M. Fedders, SEC Direc-
tor of Enforcement). But see id. ("[I]f you put the 'knowing' standard in or if you put
the 'based on' standard in, you would be making our prosecutorial efforts much more
difficult.").
'0 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-24 ("The choice of the 'while in pos-
session of' statutory language... can be read as an endorsement of the broader [pos-
session] test for insider trading liability.").
,07 See Donald C. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect
on Existing Law, 37VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1290 (1984) ("[A] discussion in the course of
the House hearings suggests that the drafters were aware of precisely what they were
doing."); see also IANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-24 ("[T]he legislative history is
clear that this language was chosen to reflect precedent that makes motivation insig-
nificant in determining insider trading liability."); id. at 3-24 n.8 ("Certainly, Congress
had the opportunity to change the law to an 'on the basis of' test, but chose instead to
endorse what it felt was the preferable prevailing interpretation of the law."); Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 786 ("Congress, both in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984 and in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,
opted specifically for the 'possession' test.").
Indeed, although the securities laws do not define insider trading, Congress has
described insider trading as "the term used to refer to trading in the securities markets
while in possession of 'material' information (generally, information that would be im-
portant to an investor in making a decision to buy or sell a security) that is not avail-
able to the general public." H.R. RFP. No. 98-355, at 2 (1984) (emphasis added), re-
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275; see also 130 CONG. REC. 20,107 (1984)
(statement of Senator D'Amato) ("Insider trading is defined loosely as 'trading while in
possession ofmaterial nonpublic information.'" (emphasis added)).
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Having briefly reviewed the "possession versus use" debate, the
next Part will examine more closely and assess the arguments that
have been offered in support of the "use" standard, concluding that
these arguments improperly rely on prior case law and are based on
incorrect interpretations of Supreme Court precedent.
III. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE "USE" STANDARD
Advocates of the "use" standard, including the Adler and Smith
courts, have found support for the "use" standard in insider trading
case law, especially in Supreme Court precedent.'08 In particular, they
have observed that such precedent contains references to the "use" of
inside information or to trading "on the basis of" such information.
These advocates have also noted the Supreme Court's emphasis on
fraud in its discussions of the insider trading prohibition. But, as will
be discussed, this reliance on prior case law-and, more specifically,
on Supreme Court precedent-is misplaced.
A. "Use"Language
Advocates of the "use" standard often point to the "use" language
employed throughout the Supreme Court opinions addressing insider
trading. They argue that this language suggests that the trader must
have actually used the information to be liable for insider trading. Re-
liance on this "use" language, however, is inappropriate. In all of the
Supreme Court cases cited by advocates of the "use" standard, it was
clear that the defendants had in fact used nonpublic information in
consummating their trades. As a result, it was natural for the Court to
employ "use" language, and the Court was not careful about distin-
guishing between "possession" and "use."
In Chiarella, for example, the Supreme Court asserted that "a duty
to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of
nonpublic market information. " 109 And throughout Chiarella, the Su-
preme Court refers to the "use" of inside information and trading "on
the basis of" such information. 0 Similarly, throughout the Dirks opin-
in See, e.g., Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337 ("[W]e believe that Supreme Court dicta and the
lower court precedent suggest that the use test is the appropriate test."). See generally
Horwich, supra note 5 (providing extensive examination of insider trading case law in
the context of the "possession versus use" debate).
"o Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
"' See, e.g., id. at 226 (explaining that in Cady, Roberts, the SEC found that a broker-
dealer violated § 10(b) by "selling securities on the basis of undisclosed information"
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ion, the Supreme Court referred to "trading on"11' inside information,
and asserted that "insiders [are] forbidden ... from personally using
"112undisclosed corporate information to their advantage." More re-
cently, in O'Hagan, the Supreme Court, referring to the "'classical
theory' of insider trading liability," explained that "[section] 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the se-
curities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic informa-
tion""m and, referring to the misappropriation theory, asserted that
"the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains
the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his
principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities."
4
The Supreme Court's repeated employment of phrases such as "on
the basis of'-particularly in the recent O'Hagan opinion-has sug-
gested to many observers that the Court has considered the "posses-
sion versus use" debate and has endorsed the "use" standard. 5
(emphasis added)); id. at 229 ("The federal courts have found violations of § 10(b)
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for their own benefit." (empha-
sis added)); id. at 230 (explaining that the "duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees
that corporate insiders... will not benefit personally through fraudulent use of mate-
rial, nonpublic information" (emphasis added)); id. at 230 n.12 ("'Tippees' of corpo-
rate insiders have been held liable under § 10(b) because they have a duty not to profit
from the use of inside information .... " (emphasis added)); id. at 231 ("Petitioner's
use of that information was not a fraud under § 10(b) unless he was subject to an af-
firmative duty to disclose it before trading." (emphasis added)); id. at 233 ("We cannot
affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty between all partici-
pants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic informa-
tion." (emphasis added)); id. (referring to "the problems caused by misuse of market
information" and the "use of market information" (emphasis added)).
.. See, eg., Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (explaining that in Chiarea, "the Court found
that there is no general duty to disclose before trading n material nonpublic informa-
tion" (emphasis added)); id. at 655 (referring to the "requirement of a specific rela-
tionship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside information"
(emphasis added)); id. (discussing "how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to re-
frain from trading on inside information" (emphasis added)); id. at 661 n.21 ("De-
pending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's trading on ma-
terial nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below ethical standards of
conduct." (emphasis added)).
112 Id. at 659 (emphasis added).
"3 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52 (emphasis added).
"' Id. at 656 (emphasis added). The Court employs similar language throughout
the opinion. See, e.g., id. at 655-56 (examining "the § 10(b) requirement that the mis-
appropriator's deceptive use of information be 'in connection with the purchase or
sale of [a] security'" (emphasis added)); id. at 656 (referring to a "misappropriator
who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information" (emphasis added)); id. at
659 n.9 (discussing "[section] 10(b) liability when a person trad[es] on the basis of non-
public information" (emphasis added)).
115 See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Insider Trading Liability: 'Use v. Posses-
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As the Adler and Smith courts acknowledged, however, the Su-
preme Court's use of such language is merely dicta.' 6 The issue of
whether possession is sufficient was not before the Court in any of
those cases: in all three cases, it was clear that the defendants had in
fact used the inside information in consummating their trades.' 7 Be-
cause the defendants had used the information, it was natural for the
Court to employ "use" language; in referring to insider trading with
"use" language, the Court was merely describing what the defendants
had done in those cases. 18 Further, because, the issue of "possession
versus use" was not before the Court, it is likely that the Court did not
consider carefully its choice of language in that context. 9 Indeed, in
sion,' N.Y.LJ., Oct. 29, 1998, at 5 ("[S]everal commentators have suggested that
O'Hagan substantially undermines the SEC's 'possession' theory ... ."); Harvey L. Pitt
& Karl A. Groskaufinanis, The Supreme Court Has Upheld the Misappropriation Theory, But
How Far the SEC Will Take the Ruling Is Anything But Clear, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 1997, at B4
("O'Hagan undermines the SEC's possession theory of liability ... stress[ing] that the
test for insider trading liability is whether the person accused traded on the basis of
material, nonpublic information.").
116 See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1067 (recognizing that the Supreme Court's language was
merely dicta); Adler, 137 F.3d at 1334 ("We acknowledge that the Supreme Court's lan-
guage in Chiarella, Di*s, and O'Hagan is dicta, because in those cases there was no
question that the material nonpublic information was actually used in trading.").
117 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 648 (explaining that O'Hagan "us[ed] for his own trad-
ing purposes material, nonpublic information regarding Grand Met's planned tender
offer [of Pillsbury]"); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648 (asserting that Dirks "disclosed [material,
nonpublic] information to investors who relied on it in trading in the shares of the
corporation"); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) (referring to Chiarella's testimony at trial that he "used that information [the
names of companies that were to become the object of takeover bids] as a basis for
purchasing stock" (internal quotations omitted)).
"a See 7 Loss & SEU1GMAN, supra note 39, at 3504-05 ("When there is no question
that the inside information was actually used in trading-which is normally the case-
it seems natural to speak in terms of not trading 'on' or 'on the basis of' the informa-
tion without necessarily implying that possession alone would not suffice.").
"9 There are several lower court decisions in which the court employs both "use"
and "possession" language interchangeably. See 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFEiS, supra note
6, § 7.4(620), at 7:160.12 ("A number of other decisions speak of use (or its equiva-
lents) but also, and more or less interchangeably, of possession."); see also United States
v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that "under [the traditional
theory of insider trading] a corporate insider trades in the securities of his own corpo-
ration on the basis of material, non-public information," but that "under the misappro-
priation theory § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated whenever a person trades while in
knowingpossession of material, non-public information that has been gained in violation
of a fiduciary duty to its source" (emphasis added)); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307,
312, 314 (6th Cir. 1976) (noting that "the district court found that all [the defendants]
had violated Rule 10b-5 by trading in ... stock while in possession of material inside in-
formation," and later describing the issue before the court as "how far the courts are to
extend the private civil right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the
alleged violation is the unlawful use of inside information and the stock involved is
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O'Hagan, the Court employed "use" language when referring to Rule
14e-3, even though that rule explicitly adopted a "possession" stan-
dard."O The Court asserted: "One violates Rule 14e-3(a) if he trades
on the basis of material nonpublic information concerning a pending
tender offer that he knows or has reason to know has been ac-
quired.., from an insider of the offeror or issuer, or someone work-
ing on their behalf."1' It thus appears that the Court was not paying
close attention to its employment of "use" and "possession" language.
When analyzing the language of the Supreme Court, one must
also examine carefully the context of the Court's statements and the
point the Court was attempting to make. For example, when the Su-
preme Court declared that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information, "1n
the Court was referring to the notion that there is no fraud under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 absent a fiduciary duty to disclose informa-
tion before trading.123 The Court asserted that such a duty to disclose
"arises from a specific relationship between two parties,"124 such as a
"relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of a
corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential infor-
mation by reason of their position with that corporation. "'25 Rather
than making a distinction between "possession" and "use" as an ele-
ment of an insider trading violation, the Court was instead addressing
the issue of who could be liable for insider trading-to whom the duty
to "abstain or disclose" applied. 26 And, explicitly rejecting the parity-
of-information theory, the Court concluded that the "disclose or ab-
stain" rule applies not to everyone who possesses (or uses) material,
traded upon an impersonal market" (emphasis added)); SEC v. Antar, 15 F. Supp. 2d
477, 528, 529 (D.NJ. 1998) (noting that "§ 10(b) and Rule 10>b5 are violated when a
corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material,
nonpublic information," and later asserting that "the provisions discussed above [sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] prohibit a person from selling securities while in possession of
material, nonpublic information" (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
'20 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 4e-3 and observing
that it provides for a "knowing possession" standard).
121 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Chest-
man, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (1991) (en banc)).
122 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
123 See i&. ("When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be
no fraud absent a duty to speak").
124 Id. at 233.
'2 Id. at228.
126 See 2 BROMBERG & LOwENFELs, supra note 6, § 7.4(620), at 7:160.11
("[P]ossession is considered by the Court in reference to the creation of the disclose or
abstain duty, not in juxtaposition to use as an element of violation.").
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nonpublic information, but only to those with a pre-existing fiduciary
duty to shareholders. 
27
Similarly, in considering the Supreme Court's statements in
O'Hagan, it is important to note that the Court's discussion took place
in the context of the misappropriation theory. 12 In the context of the
"possession versus use" debate, some commentators have drawn a dis-
tinction between the classical theory of insider trading and the misap-
propriation theory.'2 They argue that the misappropriation theory
presupposes the use of inside information: underlying the theory is
the notion that "a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a princi-
pal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of
loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use
of that information. " '3° Under this theory, the "misappropriation" oc-
' See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-33 (rejecting the parity-of-information theory). For
a discussion of the parity-of-information theory, see supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
,2 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 649 (explaining that the Court was considering "the
propriety of the misappropriation theory under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5"). For a de-
scription of the misappropriation theory, see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
'2 See, e.g., FERRARA ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.01 [5], at 2-14.6 to 2-14.7 (suggesting
that "the answer [to the 'possession versus use' debate] is best viewed as a function of a
number of specific factors, including: whether the case is brought under the misap-
propriation theory or the classical theory of insider trading liability"); Horwich, supra
note 5, at 1237-38 ("In order to focus the analysis of whether there is a distinction be-
tween (i) affirmatively using material inside information to trade, and (ii) trading
while in possession of material inside information but without making deliberate use
of the information, the analysis [in] this Article is limited to the classical theory."); see
also supra Part L.A (discussing the classical theory of insider trading and the misappro-
priation theory). But see infra note 133 (arguing that if one accepts the "equal-access"
theory, there is no reason to distinguish between the classical theory and the misap-
propriation theory for purposes of the "possession versus use" debate).
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. The view that the misappropriation theory presup-
poses use, however, is not universally held. See United States v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83,
87 (2d Cir. 1997) (asserting that "under the misappropriation theory § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 are violated whenever a person trades while in knowing possession of material, non-
public information that has been gained in violation of a fiduciary duty to its source"
(emphasis added)); LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 6.05[3], at 6-32 (referring to the
misappropriation theory and describing the prohibited conduct as "trading while in
possession" of inside information); id. at 6-32 n.16 ("Actually, an open question is
whether the misappropriation theory requires motivation or mere possession."). In-
deed, Teicher, the case in which the Second Circuit explicitly endorsed the "knowing
possession" standard, involved the misappropriation theory. See United States v.
Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the misappropriation theory and
its application to the case). The Supreme Court may have employed "use" language in
O'Hagan merely because it was clear that the defendant had in fact used the inside in-
formation. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (arguing that because the
defendant used the information, it was natural for the Court to employ "use" lan-
guage); see also 3 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 6, § 7.5(517) (3), at 7:242.27 to
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curs when the fiduciary uses the information without the principal's
knowledge or permission.3 3 Even if the Court was consciously and
purposefully employing "use" language in O'Hagan,1 32 such language is
closely linked with its discussion of the misappropriation theory and
should not be read as implicating the "possession" standard under the
classical theory.153
7:242.28 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining that "the government presented the [O'Hagan]
case in 'use' terms, probably preferring not to complicate the misappropriation issue,"
and suggesting that one should not attach too much weight to the Court's choice of
language).
1 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 ("[T]he fiduciary's fraud is consum-
mated.., when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to pur-
chase or sell securities."); Phyllis Diamond, McLucas Hails O'Hagan Ruling, But Says
Issues over Reach of Theory Remain, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1097, 1098 (1997) (quoting
SEC Enforcement Director William McLucas, who explained that "the impropriety in-
volved when someone like Mr. O'Hagan is a defendant is not getting the information"
and that the misappropriation takes place when the defendant "uses [the information]
to trade"); see also Horwich, supra note 5, at 1238 n.13 ("While it is easy to pose exam-
ples of an insider possessing nonpublic information but arguably not using it in mak-
ing a trading decision, it is much more difficult to envision a plausible situation where
someone first misappropriates information (an affirmative wrongful act) and then
trades without using it.").
112 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (asserting that because the "posses-
sion versus use" issue was not before the Supreme Court, the Court may not have paid
close attention to its choice of "possession" or "use" language).
i3 See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.01[5], at 2-14.7 to 2-14.8 (suggesting that
the O'Hagan Court's use of the phrase "on the basis of' is intertwined with its analysis
of the misappropriation theory and arguing that under the classical theory of insider
trading the "knowing possession" standard may still be "the better test"); Diamond,
supra note 131, at 1098 (asserting that despite the Court's "use" language in O'Hagan,
"certainly with respect to traditional insiders and certainly in the conventional analysis
of tippee liability, we would argue that the standard remains.. . 'in possession of ").
Under the Supreme Court's conceptualization of the misappropriation theory in
O'Hagan, the misappropriation involves the taking or use of inside information without
the consent of the source of the information. The duty to disclose is owed only to the
source of the information, and no violation of§ 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 occurs if the fidu-
ciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the information. See O'Hagan,
521 U.S. at 654-55 & n.6 (noting that the "disclosure obligation runs to the source of
the information" and asserting that "if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he
plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no... § 10(b) violation"). In
this sense, the misappropriation theory is quite distinct from the classical theory, and it
is on this basis that many have removed the misappropriation theory from the "posses-
sion versus use" debate. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining that
some commentators have distinguished the classical theory from the misappropriation
theory in the context of the "possession versus use" debate).
If, however, one accepts the equal-access theory, one must disclose information
before trading if such information is not legally accessible to others. See supra note 29
and accompanying text (discussing the "equality of access to information" or "equal
access" theory). This theory applies to insiders and outsiders alike, see supra notes 16-
17 and accompanying text (defining "outsider trading"), effectively unifying the classi-
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Proponents of the "use" standard have relied heavily on the "use"
language employed in many of the Supreme Court cases addressing
insider trading. Such reliance, however, is misplaced. In each of
those cases, a causal connection clearly existed between the insider's
trades and the inside information. Because the defendants had in fact
used the information, it was natural for the Court to employ "use"
language. Advocates of the "use" standard have recognized that "pos-
session versus use" was not at issue in these cases and thus that the Su-
preme Court's adoption of "use" language is merely dicta. These ad-
vocates, however, have failed to recognize that the Court's choice of
language in the cases is unreliable because the Court was not careful
about distinguishing between "possession" and "use."
B. Scienter and the Emphasis on Fraud
Advocates of the "use" standard have also found support for their
position in the Supreme Court's emphasis on fraud in its discussions
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and in the scienter requirement. Li-
ability cannot attach under section 10(b) and Rule 101>5 unless it is
shown that the defendant acted with scienter.34 Although the courts
have not clearly defined the term-particularly in the context of in-
sider trading-the Supreme Court has asserted that scienter "refers to
a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
13 5
cal and misappropriation theories. Because there are no longer relevant distinctions
between the classical and misappropriation theories under this approach, arguments
regarding the "possession" or "use" standard would apply equally to both theories.
This Comment argues that the "possession" standard is the most appropriate rule, see
infra Part IV, and further recommends that the "possession" standard be applied in
insider trading cases under both the classical theory and the misappropriation theory.
This is essentially the approach embodied in Rule 14e-3 pertaining to trading in the
context of tender offers. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Rule
14e-3). There seems to be no reason, however, to limit such an approach only to ten-
der offers, and this approach should be expanded to the more general cases of insider
trading.
"4 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-22 ("Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
require a showing of scienter on the part of the defendant in order for liability to at-
tach.").
1 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976); see also
LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-22 (asserting that "the courts have never of-
fered a clear definition of scienter" and citing the Court's formulation of the term in
Hochfelder). As one commentator has observed:
Inherently an elusive concept, scienter suffers particular problems in insider
trading. It has to fit many different versions of the violation, some of them
quite peculiar. Some of the standard articulations aren't well suited to insider
trading. And, perhaps as a result, courts struggling to find words that make
sense in factual contexts use multiple expressions which are not always consis-
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Some advocates of the "use" standard have argued that a showing of
scienter requires a showing that the defendant actually used the inside
information in consummating his trade.3s These arguments, how-
ever, are based on an improper interpretation of the scienter re-
quirement in the context of insider trading.
In Adler, for example, the Eleventh Circuit argued that the defen-
dant's motivation for trading-namely, whether or not he traded on
the basis of inside information-was relevant to the issue of scienter.'1
7
The Adler court based its argument on a footnote from Dirks, in which
the Supreme Court asserted:
[M]otivation is not irrelevant to the issue of scienter. It is not enough
that an insider's conduct results in harm to investors; rather, a violation
may be found only where there is "intentional or willful conduct de-
signed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affect-
ing the price of securities.
"Iss
Similarly, in Smith, the Ninth Circuit argued that the scienter re-
quirement supports a "use" standard, contending that "an investor
who has a preexisting plan to trade, and who carries through with that
plan after coming into possession of material nonpublic information,
does not intend to defraud or deceive."39 Again, these arguments are
based on an improper interpretation of the scienter requirement in
the context of insider trading.
Under the common law concept of fraud, a defendant is said to
tent. ... Moreover, scienter is described in very different terms, sometimes in
the same court opinion.
2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 6, § 7.4(810), at 7:163.
Nor is the term scienter defined in the federal securities laws. See id. § 7.4(800), at
7:162 ("[Scienter] appears nowhere in the 1933 or 1934 Securities Acts or their
rules.").
6 See, e.g., 2 BROMBERG & LOWNENFELS, supra note 6, § 7.4(620), at 7:160.12 ("Even
if use is not specified as an element of the violation, it may be construed as a compo-
nent of another required element: scienter."); Horwich, supra note 5, at 1248 (noting
that some "cases have addressed the possession versus use issue ostensibly in the con-
text of whether scienter had been proven"). Other commentators have recognized a
link between the scienter requirement and the "possession versus use" debate, al-
though they have stopped short of asserting that the scienter requirement necessitates
the adoption of the "use" standard. See, e.g., FERRARA ET AL, supra note 6, § 2.01[5], at
2-12 ("Another important issue in insider trading cases, inextricably linked to Section
10(b)'s and Rule 10b-5's requirement of scienter, involves what is often termed the
'possession vs. use' debate.").
137 AdLer, 137 F.3d at 1334 (noting that "the majority and the dissent in Dirks dis-
agreed about whether motivation is relevant to proving scienter as an element of an
insider trading violation").
" Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 n.23 (quoting Hochfilder, 425 U.S. at 199).
13 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068.
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act with scienter if he misstates a material fact, knowing that the
statement is false and intending that the recipient of such information
rely on it.140 In the context of insider trading, the scienter require-
ment has been interpreted to mean that the defendant must have had
actual knowledge of material, nonpublic information and also must
have known that the information was both material and nonpublic.141
The reason for the defendant's actions is largely irrelevant, provided
he acted knowingly.
| 4
1
Indeed, in interpreting the scienter requirement, one must dis-
tinguish between "the lack of good faith required for scienter" and
"bad motive," 43 which is not required. Although scienter requires in-
tent, it does not require intent "in the sense of intent to harm or do
evil"; rather, the intent required by scienter is "the intent to commit
the fraud itself."144 As William H. Kuehnle has explained, "the grava-
men of the moral deficiency in fraud is not that the defendant was try-
140 See Loss & SEuIGMAN, supra note 21, at 751 (explaining that "the defendant
must know of the falsity [of his statement] (this kind of knowledge is called 'scienter'),
but make the statement nevertheless for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to rely
on it").
141 SeeSEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 1983) (explaining that "the [sci-
enter] requirement is satisfied if at the time defendant purchased stock he had actual
knowledge of undisclosed material information; knew it was undisclosed, and knew it
was material"); see also ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 8.10.3, at 328
(1986) ("The point of [Hochfelder] in this context would seem to be only that the de-
fendant must have known that the information to which he had access while trading
was material and nonpublic.").
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of whether reck-
lessness could constitute scienter, see Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12 ("In certain areas
of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes
of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here the question whether, in
some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5."), and "[v]irtually all lower courts addressing this issue since Hochfelder
have concluded that a rule 101-5 violation may be grounded on 'recklessness'... and
that knowing, intentional misconduct is not a necessary ingredient of establishing li-
ability." ROBERTW. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 935 (5th ed.
1994).
142 As Langevoort notes: "The law of fraud on which this [duty to disclose or ab-
stain] is based is a clear-cut disclosure duty for the benefit of the protected party, not
limited to situations where it is shown that the fiduciary was trying to take advantage of
the information." LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-26; see also RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 551 (2) (a) (1977) ("One party to a business transaction is under
a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is
consummated, (a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of
a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them .... .").
143 William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the Federal Secu-
ritiesLaws, 34 HOuS. L. REV. 121, 195 (1997).
144 Id.
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ing to harm the victim, but rather that the defendant was willing to
mislead the victim."14 If, for example, an insider knowingly made
false statements to an investor about the corporation's stock, he would
be guilty of fraud-regardless of his motives for making such misrep-
resentations.1 Analogizing to the context of insider trading, a defen-
dant who knowingly trades while in possession of material, nonpublic
information acts with the requisite scienter, regardless of his motives
for trading. As the SEC argued in Smith, the "requisite intent to de-
fraud is inherent in the act of trading while in possession of inside in-
formation."47 The Adler and Smith courts fail to make this distinction
between "intent to harm" and "intent to commit fraud" when they as-
sert that a defendant does not act with the requisite scienter if he has
an "innocent" reason for trading.
Much of the confusion surrounding the scienter requirement may
be attributed to the frequent establishment of scienter through the
use of circumstantial evidence. In reading cases that have discussed
the scienter requirement, courts and commentators have confused
the reliance on use of information to prove scienter with a require-
ment that use of information be proved in order to satisfy the scienter
element. In some cases, there may not be direct evidence that the de-
fendant had knowledge of (knowingly possessed) the inside informa-
tion or that the defendant knew such information was material. In
such cases, courts may rely on "suspicious" trading as evidence that
the defendant actually knew the information, or the court may rely on
evidence that the defendant used inside information to prove that the
defendant knew such information was material. In these cases, evi-
dence of the defendant's use of information is not independently im-
portant; rather, it is relevant merely as a means of establishing that the
1 Id.
6 See id. (discussing a similar hypothetical and citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 526 (1977) as support); see also LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 842 n.314
(citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW* OF TORTS 741 (W.
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) and asserting that "the intent to deceive or mislead or
convey a false impression that is implicit in the scienter concept goes simply to the
matter of belief, or absence of belief, that the representation is true").
117 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068.
I See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983) (noting
that "proof of scienter required in fraud cases is often a matter of inference from cir-
cumstantial evidence"); see also LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-22 n.2 ("Scien-
ter can, of course, be established by circumstantial evidence."); LOSS & SELIGMAN, su-
pra note 21, at 837 ("[Ilntent (or scienter) being subjective, it must often 'be inferred
from a series of seemingly isolated acts and instances which have been... aptly desig-
nated as badges of fraud." (quoting Nassan v. United States, 126 F.2d 613, 615 (4th
Cir. 1942))).
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defendant possessed the information and knew that the information
was material. In SEC v. MacDonald, for example, the defendant ap-
pealed the trial court's finding of scienter, asserting that the SEC had
failed to establish that he knew the inside information was material.'49
The court, however, found that the "inside information was a motivat-
ing factor in [the defendant's] purchase of... stock"'; ° and con-
cluded that such use of the information was evidence that the defen-
dant considered the information to be material.15'
On the other hand, where there is little or no evidence that the
defendants actually possessed material, nonpublic information, the
court may rely on evidence of legitimate or innocent reasons for trad-
ing to conclude that the defendant did not act with the requisite sci-
enter. 52 In In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, for example, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, insiders who sold some of their
shares prior to the company's bankruptcy, violated the insider trading
prohibitions.' The plaintiffs tried to use evidence of the defendants'
trading as evidence that the defendants had access to material, non-
public information.54 But, observing that the defendants sold only asmall percentage of their holdings and suffered large losses when the
19 MacDona4, 699 F.2d at 50 ("Defendant does not contest ... the court's finding
that he had knowledge of the facts found to be material, and knew such facts to be un-
disclosed. He does claim, however, that the SEC failed to establish... the necessary
third element, knowledge of materiality....").
50 Id. at 51.
"' See id. ("Obviously, if defendant himself considered the information important
in deciding whether to purchase, he knew a reasonable investor would likewise con-
sider it important in deciding whether to sell.").
152 As Langevoort explains:
In many cases, a defendant argues factually that he was not in posses-
sion ... of any inside information when he traded. The SEC... has only cir-
cumstantial evidence of possession. In this setting, many courts have wisely
taken the position that the timing of the trade (e.g., shortly after a telephone
conversation with someone who clearly knew the information and had some
reason to pass it on) suffices to create an inference of insider trading, but only
if such a trade was inconsistent with the defendant's prior pattern of trading
activity. As such, if the defendant had some predetermined plan of selling, or
was buying or selling only in normal amounts, it would rebut any inference
of... possession ....
LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-25.
"3 35 F.3d 1407, 1427 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the plaintiffs' allegations that the
defendants traded "with knowledge of undisclosed adverse, material information").
'5 See id. ("Plaintiffs assert that since these defendants sold some of their
shares... prior to [the company's] financial collapse, they must have known of some
information, not already known to the market, that signalled [the company's] immi-
nent doom." (quoting In reWorlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850, 871 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) [hereinafter Worlds of Wonder I1])).
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company went bankrupt, the court suggested that the trades did not
seem suspicious and asserted that one could not reasonably conclude
from such trades alone that the defendants possessed inside informa-
tion."'5 Because there was no other evidence that the defendants pos-
sessed nonpublic information, the court thus concluded that the de-
fendants lacked scienter.1m
In reading cases such as MacDonald and Worlds of Wonder, courts
and commentators have confused the reliance on use of information
to prove scienter with a requirement that use of information be
proved in order to satisfy the scienter element. Indeed, the Adler
court cited Worlds of Wonder in support of the "use" standard, asserting
that "[ i]n a number of cases, courts have allowed insiders to introduce
evidence of preexisting plans or other 'innocuous' reasons for sales in
order to rebut an inference of scienter.' 57 In particular, the Adler
court pointed to the statement in Worlds of Wonder that "'[e]ven if the
evidence was sufficient to permit an inference that one or more of the
defendants had access to inside information, the defendants' actual
trading would conclusively rebut an inference of scienter.'"58 The Ad-
ler court further observed that in Worlds of Wonder, "the court empha-
sized that some of the insiders 'sold their shares pursuant to a prede-
termined plan,' one insider sold 'because it faced a pressing need to
service a huge debt incurred from overinvesting in real estate,' and
another insider only sold a small percentage of his shares." 9 The Ad-
ler court therefore concluded that scienter requires use-not mere
possession-of inside information.' 6° But in interpreting Worlds of
Wonder, it is important to recall that there was no evidence that the de-
161fendants actually possessed any inside information. The court was not
155 See id. (asserting that "when one considers the amounts traded, Plaintiffs' claims
appear fantastic" and concluding that "no reasonablejury could find that insider trad-
ing had occurred" (quoting Worlds of Wonderl, 814 F. Supp. at 872)).
'm See id. (explaining that the "[p]laintiffs cannot point to any bit of information
traded on by these defendants that was not already known to the market" and conclud-
ing that "no reasonable jury could find.., that these defendants acted with scienter"
(quoting Worlds of Wonderl, 814 F. Supp. at 872)).
157 Adler, 137 F.3d at 1335.
Id. (quoting Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1427-28).
Id. (citing Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1427-28).
160 See id, (asserting that cases such as Worlds of Wonder "provide support for the
proposition that there is no violation of§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of some
causal connection between the material nonpublic information and an insider's trad-
ing").
161 See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of evidence that
defendants possessed nonpublic information).
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suggesting that use of information is a requirement for scienter.
Rather, the defendants' preexisting trading plans were relevant only
as far as they provided evidence that the defendants did not possess
inside information. 62 Indeed, if there had in fact been independent
proof that the defendants possessed material, nonpublic information,
the court likely would have found scienter. The Adler court's conclu-
sion that the scienter requirement mandates a "use" standard is thus
based on an improper interpretation of scienter and the manner in
which it is often established in the context of insider trading.lss
The Adler court found further support for its assertion that a de-
fendant's motivation for trading is relevant in the Supreme Court's
holding that a tipper must personally benefit from his tip to be liable
for insider trading.'6 The Adler court, however, seems to have taken
the Supreme Court's holding out of context. In asserting that an in-
sider must benefit from his tip, the Supreme Court observed that not
all disclosures of confidential information constitute a breach of fidu-
ciary duty. 65 The Supreme Court noted that an insider who conveys
such information may not know that the information is confidential-
he may mistakenly believe that the information has already been pub-
licly disclosed-or the insider may not believe that such information is
material. 66 The requirement of a benefit, then, seems merely to be a
means of ensuring that the tipper-defendant knew the information
was material and nonpublic.167
Citing the O'Hagan opinion, the Adler court also claimed the sup-
162 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-25 n.1 1 (discussing Worlds of Wonder
and the inappropriateness of interpreting that case as favoring the use standard).
" See id. at 3-26 n.1 ("Citation to these sorts of cases as authority in favor of a use
standard... is plainly inappropriate."); id. at 3-25 to 3-26 ("These cases... have no
bearing whatsoever on choosing between the two standards [possession or use]-a point
that the courts in Adler and Smith unfortunately missed when they cited them in sup-
port of the use test.").
'" Adler, 137 F.3d at 1334 ("[T]he Dirks Court's holding that [a] tipper must gain
some personal advantage in order for [a] tippee to be liable for trading on material
nonpublic information, suggests that knowing possession of material nonpublic infor-
mation at the time of trading may not be enough to establish liability for insider trad-
ing."); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661-62 (1983) (asserting that the insider must
benefit from his tip for there to be a breach of fiduciary duty and insider trading liabil-
ity).
1 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661-62 ("All disclosures of confidential corporate informa-
tion are not inconsistentwith the duty insiders owe to shareholders.").
166 See id. at 662 ("Corporate officials may mistakenly think the information already
has been disclosed or that it is not material enough to affect the market.").
'67 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-26 n.13 (asserting that one cannot
look to Dirks's requirement of a benefit to resolve the "possession versus use" debate).
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port of the Supreme Court for the proposition that the "knowing pos-
session test may prohibit actions that are not themselves fraudulent."'s
In particular, the Adler court noted the following assertion from
O'Hagan "under § 14(e), the Commission may prohibit acts, not
themselves fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b), if the pro-
hibition is 'reasonably designed to prevent.., acts and practices
[that] are fraudulent."" 69 But the Adler court misinterpreted the Su-
preme Court's discussion, taking statements it made about section
14(e) and Rule 14e-3 out of their original context. In O'Hagan, the
Supreme Court was addressing the defendant's contention that the
SEC had exceeded its rulemaking authority under § 14(e) when it
adopted Rule 14e-3(a)."' Although it is true that Rule 14e-3 adopted
a "knowing possession standard,"71 this aspect of the rule was not un-
der attack. Rather, O'Hagan contested the validity of Rule 14e-3(a)
because it imposes a duty to "disclose or abstain" regardless of
whether the trader has a preexisting fiduciary duty to either the
shareholders or the source of the information.'1 As the Supreme
Court asserted in Chiarella, there is no fraud absent a fiduciary duty to
disclose information before trading.ln Because Rule 14e-3 imposes
liability even where there is no such fiduciary duty, effectively prohib-
iting conduct which is not fraudulent under Chiarella, the defendant
in O'Hagan argued that the SEC had exceeded its rulemaking author-
ity to define fraud under section 14(e). The Supreme Court did not
resolve whether the SEC exceeded its section 14(e) power to define
fraud. Instead, the Court noted that section 14(e) also gave the SEC
'6' Adler, 137 F.3d at 1338 (citing O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673).
'69 Id. (citing O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673).
170 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666-67 (considering whether "the Commis-
sion... exceed[edl its rulemaking authority under § 14(e) when it adopted Rule 14e-
3(a) without requiring a showing that the trading at issue entailed a breach of fiduciary
duty"). Section 14(e) gave the SEC authority to "define, and prescribe means rea-
sonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1997).
171 See supra note 58 (discussing Rule 14e-3).
1 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 669 (explaining that "[i]n the Eighth Circuit's view,
[and presumably in the defendant's view,] because Rule 14e-3(a) applies whether or
not the trading in question breaches a fiduciary duty, the regulation exceeds the SEC's
§ 14(e) rulemaking authority"). The "possession" standard suggested for section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 liability does not eliminate the requirement of a fiduciary duty re-
quired under both the classical theory and the misappropriation theory. See supra Part
L.A (discussing the two theories of insider trading liability).
17 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 ("When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondis-
closure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak."); see also supra notes 122-27
(discussing Chiarella and the fiduciary duty requirement).
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"prophylactic" authority to prevent fraud,'74 and concluded that Rule
14e-3(a) "qualifies under § 14(e) as a 'means reasonably designed to
prevent' fraudulent trading on material, nonpublic information in the
tender offer context"' 75 It was only in this context that the Supreme
Court held that under section 14(e) the SEC may prohibit actions that
are not fraudulent. When considered in the proper context, the Su-
preme Court's assertion does not support the Adler court's conclusion
that the "knowing possession" standard prohibits conduct that is not
fraudulent.
Indeed, examined in the proper context, statements by the Su-
preme Court lend little support to the arguments in favor of the "use"
standard; many of the statements relied upon by advocates of the
"use" standard have been misinterpreted and taken out of their origi-
nal context. Although reliance on Supreme Court precedent and
other insider trading case law in support of the "use" standard thus
appears unwarranted, nothing in the preceding discussion suggests
that "knowing possession" is the correct standard. 7 6 The next Part
sets forth the reasons for adopting a "possession" standard.
IV. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE "KNOWING POSSESSION" STANDARD
There are two primary reasons for adopting the "possession" stan-
dard and imposing insider trading liability for trading while in posses-
sion of material, nonpublic information. The first relates to the diffi-
culty of proving actual use. The second relates to the rationale
underlying the insider trading prohibition-the concern that inves-
174 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673 (citing Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1,
11 n.11 (1985), in which the Court asserted that "§ 14(e)'s rulemaking authorization
gives the Commission 'latitude,'... 'to regulate nondeceptive activities as a "reasona-
bly designed" means of preventing manipulative acts, without suggesting any change in
the meaning of the term "manipulative" itself'").
'7 Id. at 672. Note, however, that the SEC seems to have been exercising its fraud-
defining authority, rather than its prophylactic authority in Rule 14e-3 (a), see 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-3(a) (1999) (providing that the activity described "shall constitute a fraudu-
lent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of Section 14(e) of
the Act"), although the SEC apparently believed it was exercising its prophylactic
power in Rule 14e-3(d). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d) (prohibiting certain conduct
"[als a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
acts or practices within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act").
176 Indeed, because the "possession versus use" debate has not squarely been at is-
sue in prior cases, one should not interpret the language in earlier case law as endors-
ing either the "possession" or the "use" standard. See supra Part III.A (discussing the
inappropriateness of relying on "use" language in Supreme Court insider trading opin-
ions for support of the "use" standard).
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tors perceive the securities markets as fair and honest.1"
A. Difficulty of EstablishingActual Use
The SEC has advocated the "possession" standard largely because
it believes that a "use" standard would make it unnecessarily difficult
to prosecute insider trading.' Under a "use" test, the SEC (or the
government), as well as private parties, not only would be required to
establish that the defendant possessed material, nonpublic informa-
tion, but also would "have to get into his mind" to determine whether
the trade was based on such information.7 As Director McLucas ex-
plained: "The problem with the 'on the basis of standard is clear-it
makes proof of a violation subject to metaphysical impossibility....
When a trader knows the material information, divining that
he... acted 'on the basis of as opposed to 'while in possession of
may be impossible."'8 ° With the "use" standard, the concern is that in-
sider-traders will "contrive" legitimate reasons for their transactions,
offering innocent explanations such as mortgage obligations and col-
lege tuition payments."8 As the SEC asserted: "Individuals who have
actually traded on the basis of inside information frequently attempt
to invent arguments that they have traded for other reasons. Under a
'possession' standard, such post hoc rationalizations would be irrele-
vant, and could not be used to impede enforcement of the law. "'82
The Teicher court also acknowledged this concern when it endorsed
the "knowing possession" standard: "As a matter of policy then, a re-
quirement of a causal connection between the information and the
'7 See supra Part I.B (discussing the reasons for the insider trading prohibition).
1 See House Hearings, supra note 32, at 49 (statement ofJohn M. Fedders, SEC Di-
rector of Enforcement) ("[T]he 'based on' [or 'use'] standard... would ... mak[e]
our prosecutorial efforts much more difficult."). The SEC's position, however, has not
been consistent. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC's
inconsistency in its interpretation of Rule 101-5).
'i House Hearings, supra note 32, at 49 (statement ofJohn M. Fedders, SEC Direc-
tor of Enforcement).
,80 McLucas & Angotti, supra note 34, at 5; see alsofDiamond, supra note 131, at 1098
(quoting McLucas's assertion that the government "cannot metaphysically get into
someone's head and discern what factors within their state of mind were directly
causal").
'8' SeeDiamond, supra note 131, at 1098 (explaining that the SEC's concern is that
"[tihere's not a defendant that comes in the door that won't have a separate, inde-
pendent, superseding tort law factor for his buying or selling activity").
182 Proposed Language for Inclusion in Committee Report on Insider Trading
Definition, 20 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 279, 280 (1988).
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trade could frustrate attempts to distinguish between legitimate trades
and those conducted in connection with inside information"8s3
B. Perception That Markets are Honest and Fair
The difficulty of establishing actual use of inside information is
not the only reason for adopting a "possession" standard. Considered
alone, such an explanation invites the inference that there is nothing
wrong with mere possession of material, nonpublic information at the
time of a trade, aside from the difficulty of proving actual use of such
information. One might infer that the securities laws seek to prevent
the use of inside information but, because of difficulties of proof, also
prohibit trading while in possession of such information-even
though the policy reasons underlying the insider trading prohibition
do not really apply to mere possession. This inference is the one that
many advocates of the "use" standard apparently have drawn in reject-
ing the SEC's rationale for the "possession" standard.Iss But the policy
reasons underlying the insider trading prohibition do apply to trading
while in possession of material, nonpublic information. Recognizing
the difficulties of proof associated with a "use" test, the Adler court
held that an "inference of use ... arises from the fact that [an] insider
traded while in knowing possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion." 'ss The problem with this approach, however, is its failure to
recognize that the rationale for the insider trading prohibition applies
'" Teicher, 987 F.2d at 121. Other commentators have also agreed with this argu-
ment. See, e.g., 7 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 39, at 3505 ("The very difficulty of es-
tablishing actual use of inside information points to possession as the test.").
184 SeeHorwich, supra note 5, at 1270 (explaining that "choosing the simpler rule is
defensible only if it comports equally well with the underlying policy of the law as does
the alternative, more complex rule," but that "that is not the case if actual use of the
inside information is what underlies the rationale for the prohibition"). Horwich is
implicitly assuming that the policy reasons for the insider trading prohibition do not
apply to trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information, provided
there is no causal connection between the trade and the information. See id. at 1271
(contending that the insider who trades merely while in possession of inside informa-
tion is "innocent"). As a result, he does not believe that such trading should be pro-
hibited merely because it may be difficult to distinguish between use and possession.
See id. at 1270-71 ("The fact that the distinction may be difficult to draw in some cases
does not mean that it cannot or should not be drawn wherever possible, so long as the
underlying policy for the prohibition can be respected.").
185 Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337; see also id. ("[When an insider trades while in possession
of material nonpublic information, a strong inference arises that such information was
used by the insider in trading. The insider can attempt to rebut the inference by ad-
ducing evidence that there was no causal connection between the information and the
trade....").
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equally to both trading on the basis of and trading while in possession of
inside information.86
The basic rationale for the insider trading prohibition is the belief
that insider trading undermines investors' expectations of honest and
fair securities markets and that, as a result, insider trading will dis-
courage investors from participating in the markets 7 The argument
is that investors view trading on the basis of material, nonpublic in-
formation as fundamentally unfair. The question, then, is whether in-
vestors would also question the fairness of markets in which investors
routinely trade while in possession of material, nonpublic informa-
tion-even if such traders claimed that there was no causal connec-
tion between such information and the decision to trade.
The answer to this question may be found in an observation by the
Teicher court about the nature of information. The Teicher court ob-
served: "Unlike a loaded weapon which may stand ready but unused,
material information cannot lay idle in the human brain "le Even if
an insider in possession of material, nonpublic information believes
that his trades are motivated solely by legitimate reasons, it is unlikely
that the information possessed by a trader would not in some way in-
fluence his trades. Investors are likely to believe that such informa-
tion influenced-whether consciously or subconsciously-the in-
sider's trades, despite the insider's assertions to the contrary.
Investors are likely to believe, for example, that an insider with a pre-
existing plan to sell shares to pay his daughter's college tuition, may
decide to sell 110 shares upon coming into possession of the inside
information, instead of the 100 shares he had previously planned to
sell. Investors are therefore just as likely to doubt the fairness of mar-
kets in which participants trade while in possession of inside information
as they are to doubt the fairness of markets in which participants trade
on the basis of inside information. It is for this reason that "knowing
possession" should be sufficient for insider trading liability.'8 9
"6 As the Smith court noted, another problem with this approach is that such a pre-
sumption of use cannot be applied in the criminal context. United States v. Smith, 155
F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) (asserting that in the context of a criminal prosecu-
tion, "[w]e are.., not at liberty, as was the Adler court, to establish an evidentiary pre-
sumption that gives rise to an inference of use"). On the other hand, there is no rea-
son why the standards for criminal and civil liability cannot be different; courts could
employ a "use" standard in the criminal context and a "use by presumption" standard
in the civil context.
"7See supra Part I.B (discussing the reasons for the insider trading prohibition).
" Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120.
"79 Note that this reasoning applies whether liability is predicated upon the classical
theory or the misappropriation theory of insider trading. Investors are just as likely to
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Advocates of the use standard suggest that there is nothing inher-
ently unfair about trading merely while in possession of material,
nonpublic information, since such trading involves no exploitation or
abuse of inside information.'" That may be true, but, as discussed
above, investors are likely to perceive such trading as unfair, believing
that a trader possessing inside information cannot escape the influ-
ence of such information. And to the extent that the insider trading
prohibition is based on the belief that investors will not participate in
a market that they perceive to be unfair, it is investors' perceptions that
are relevant in determining what conduct should be prohibited.
Some proponents of the "use" standard further suggest that it is
unfair to penalize and prevent from trading'9' the insider who engages
in a regular and periodic program of selling to liquidate his holdings
in the corporation's stock and obtain needed cash.12 For the insider
who, because of cash requirements, must sell regularly and cannot al-
ways wait until the information is publicly disclosed, the "possession"
test may seem particularly burdensome and unfair.9 3 But it need not
doubt the fairness of the markets if the trader is a corporate insider trading in the se-
curities of his corporation while in possession of inside information as they are if the
trader is an "outsider" such as O'Hagan, see supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text
(discussing "outsider trading" and the O'Hagan case), trading in another corporation's
securities while in possession of material, nonpublic information obtained from an
outside (confidential) source. The "knowing possession" standard should therefore be
applied in insider trading cases under both the classical theory and the misappropria-
tion theory of insider trading liability. This conclusion clearly follows if one accepts
the concept of equality of access to information (or the "equal-access" theory). See su-
pra notes 29, 133 and accompanying text (discussing the equal-access theory and its
implications for the classical theory and misappropriation theory in the context of the
"possession versus use" debate). The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the equal-
access theory, see supra note 29, and, as a result, courts and commentators may con-
tinue to distinguish between the classical theory and the misappropriation theory in
the context of the "possession versus use" debate. See supra note 129 and accompany-
ing text (explaining that some commentators have distinguished the classical theory
from the misappropriation theory for purposes of the "possession versus use" debate).
19 See Horwich, supra note 5, at 1270-76 (using various hypotheticals to suggest the
unfairness of imposing insider trading liability "when the decision to trade was made
without any exploitation of material nonpublic information").
191 Since the insider has the choice of disclosing the information or abstaining
from trading, the insider is prevented from trading only to the extent that he cannot
disclose the information. Often, however, insiders do not have the authority to dis-
close the information. See id. at 1271 n.230 ("[F]ew individual insiders have the discre-
tion or right to choose to disclose confidential material information about their em-
ployer.").
9 See id. at 1273 (discussing the case of an executive with a regular, consistent
purchase or sale program).
19s The situation is a bit different where the insider wishes to buy, rather than sell,
stock. Here, there is not the same necessity for engaging in the trade-the insider has
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be. Such an insider could, for example, maintain his stock portfolio
with an investment advisor who has complete discretion over the na-
ture and timing of transactions.'9 The investment advisor could then
execute whatever trades are necessary to provide the insider with the
cash he requires.95 The "knowing possession" standard thus goes fur-
ther than the "use" standard in ensuring the integrity of the markets,
without unnecessarily burdening insiders who wish to trade.
The Smith court, however, was concerned that a "knowing-
possession standard would... go a long way toward making insider
trading a strict liability crime."1 6 Given the statutorily authorized ten-
year prison sentence for insider trading convictions, the court was re-
luctant to adopt such a standard. 7 But the Smith court's concern was
unnecessary. The "possession" standard does not make insider trad-
ing a strict liability crime. First, the scienter requirement ensures that
the defendant knowingly (or at least recklessly) possessed inside in-
formation and that he knew such information was material.' Second,
as the Supreme Court noted in O'Hagan, a defendant may not be im-
more "flexibility" to delay his purchases until the information is disclosed to the public.
Of course, delaying purchases until disclosure may mean that the insider is purchasing
at a higher price. Nonetheless, this situation does not seem unnecessarily unfair to the
insider. Delaying the insider's purchases seems to be a reasonable price to pay for en-
suring the integrity of the market. Indeed, as between the ordinary investor and the
insider, it is the insider who is best able to bear the risk that the insider will come into
possession of inside information when he seeks to trade. See id. at 1271 (recognizing
this as a counterargument to the contention that the "possession" standard is unfair).
" SeeAlan M. Weinberger, PreventingInsider Trading Violations: A Survey of Corporate
Compliance Programs, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 180, 188 (1990) (explaining that the New York
Stock Exchange recommends, among other things, that insiders engage in trading ac-
tivities through regular investment programs in which the timing of trades is beyond
the control of the insider); see also Steinberg & Fletcher, supra note 38, at 1820 (noting
that many broker-dealer and investment firms require employees to maintain all of
their trading accounts with the firm). Of course, one could still argue that this is un-
fair, since the insider must give up discretion over his own accounts. As between the
ordinary investor and the insider, however, the insider is in the better position to bear
the "costs" of inside information. Seesupra note 193 (making this argument).
1 Such an insider could argue credibly that he did not trade, since it was his in-
vestment advisor that made the decision to trade and executed the trade.
196 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068 n.25.
19 See id. ("In view of the statutorily authorized ten-year prison sentence that may
accompany an insider trading conviction, any construction of Rule lOb-5 that de facto
eliminates the mens rea requirement should be disfavored." (citations omitted)); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1994) (authorizing a ten-year prison sentence).
"8 See supra notes 134, 140-41 and accompanying text (discussing the scienter re-
quirement); see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997) (explaining
that under 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a), "[t]o establish a criminal violation of Rule 101>5, the
Government must prove that a person 'willfully' violated the provision").
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prisoned for violating Rule lOb-5 if he proves that he had no knowl-
edge of the rule.19
Both the rationale underlying the insider trading prohibition, as
well as the difficulty of proving an insider's motivation for trading,
thus suggest that courts should adopt the "knowing possession" stan-
dard for determining insider trading liability under the federal securi-
ties laws.
CONCLUSION
Advocates of the "use" standard have looked primarily to prior
case law, particularly Supreme Court precedent, for support of their
position. The problem with this approach, however, is that the ques-
tion of "possession versus use" was not at issue in the cases relied
upon, and those opinions were not careful about making a distinction
between "possession" and "use." Indeed, many of the statements re-
lied upon by advocates of the "use" standard either are dicta or have
been misinterpreted and taken out of their original context. Rather
than relying on case law, then, one should look to the reasons for the
insider trading prohibition, as well as to the difficulty of proof associ-
ated with prosecution, to determine the proper standard. Such an in-
quiry suggests that "possession" is the more appropriate standard for
imposing insider trading liability. Nonetheless, with the recent opin-
ions by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the question of "possession
versus use" seems well on its way to being resolved in favor of the "use"
standard. Until the Supreme Court explicitly addresses the question,
however, the issue will remain open for debate.
' See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) ("[N]o person shall be subject to imprisonment under
this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no
knowledge of such rule or regulation."). Lack of knowledge of the law, however, is not
a defense to the imposition of the statutorily authorized fines of up to $1,000,000. See
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666 n.13 ("The statute provides no such defense to imposition of
monetary fines.").
